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AGAINST REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
Jonathan C. Lipson* 
This Article analyzes institutional choice in preventing and managing 
financial crises.  “Institutional choice” means that different institutions—
here, markets, courts and regulators—have different capacities to achieve 
similar goals.  While none is perfect, some may be better than others, so the 
institutions we choose to prevent or resolve failure will influence the 
likelihood and severity of future financial crises.  I use the analysis of 
institutional choice to make three claims about current (and foreseeable) 
approaches to preventing and resolving financial crises. 
First, because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial 
services firms, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: 
market concentration and complexity.  Indeed, regulators may aggravate 
these conditions through tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and 
complexity of regulation, resulting in “regulatory displacement” of markets 
and courts as institutional choices to prevent or resolve financial distress. 
Second, in the context of financial distress, institutions tend to interact 
(“braid,” in the language of contract theory literature).  Markets and courts 
can do so to create incentives to renegotiate financial distress, thus 
reducing the likelihood of crises.  Regulators and markets braid, too.  But, 
large financial firms may dominate the interactions to increase 
concentration and complexity, and thus create social costs without 
compensating benefits.  Large financial firms may protest, but they benefit 
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from the subsidies and protections of regulatory displacement, and thus 
ultimately choose it. 
Third, courts are an underappreciated institution that may ameliorate 
the pathologies of concentration and complexity by rethinking the so-called 
“duty to be informed” on the part of directors of systemically important 
financial firms.  Taking this duty more seriously here might lead directors 
to simplify and/or reduce the size of those firms, thereby creating 
conditions and incentives that would support market-oriented re-structuring 
rather than regulatory displacement if—perhaps when—crisis next strikes. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 675	  
I.	   CONCENTRATION, COMPLEXITY, AND CAPTURE—THE DOOM 
LOOP ............................................................................................... 681	  
A.	   Concentration .......................................................................... 682	  
B.	   Complexity .............................................................................. 685	  
C.	   Capture .................................................................................... 688	  
II.	   THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE .............................................. 691	  
A.	   The Contribution of Hart & Sacks: Institutional Settlement ... 692	  
B.	   The Contribution of Komesar—Comparative Institutional 
Analysis ................................................................................... 696	  
C.	   The Contribution of Gilson, Sabel and Scott—“Braiding” .... 699	  
III.	  	  	  A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS SYSTEMS ........................................................................ 701	  
A.	   Market Resolution ................................................................... 701	  
B.	   Judicial Resolution .................................................................. 705	  
C.	   Regulatory Resolution ............................................................. 708	  
IV.	  	  	  DODD-FRANK AND REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT .......................... 714	  
A.	   Which Firms? .......................................................................... 714	  
B.	   What Effect? ............................................................................ 716	  
C.	   Which Entity?—Single Point of Entry ..................................... 717	  
D.	   Which Institution? ................................................................... 721	  
E.	   Regulatory Displacement of Market-Based Renegotiation ..... 723	  
V.	   AGAINST REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT—JUDICIAL RESPONSES ... 725	  
A.	   Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14 .................................................. 726	  
B.	   Rethinking the Duty to Be Informed ........................................ 730	  
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 737	  
ARTICLE 1 (LIPSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:35 AM 
2015] AGAINST REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT 675 
 
 “They should have let Bear Stearns fail”1 
INTRODUCTION 
As we gain perspective on the financial crisis of 2008, it becomes 
increasingly clear that institutional choice will affect the likelihood and 
severity of future crises.  “Institutional choice” means that different large-
scale social processes––here, markets, courts, and regulators––have 
different capacities to prevent or minimize the effects of financial distress 
that could cascade into crises.2  Although scholars have begun to recognize 
that financial distress has an institutional dimension, they have largely 
failed to analyze institutional choice.3 
Institutional analysis helps to fill this gap.4  “Institutional analysis” 
starts from the premise that all social institutions have capacities to address 
similar problems, but their distinct characteristics may produce different 
results.  Thus, the important questions are: Which among them produce 
better (or worse) outcomes, and how are the choices to be made? 
 
 1.  Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2011, at MM24, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/magazine/sheila-bairs-exit-interview.html 
?pagewanted=all (quoting Sheila Bair, former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation). 
 2.  For discussions of the distinction between isolated failures and crises that induce 
panic, see, for example, CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS 
AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (6th ed. 2011); Charles W. Calomiris & 
Joseph R. Mason, Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1615 (2003); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983). 
 3.  See infra Part III.  A notable exception is David Skeel’s excellent paper, David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 629, 630  
(analyzing “institutional choice during and after an economic crisis”).   
 4.  The broad literature on institutional analysis typically begins with the work of 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958 tentative edition) 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds, 1994) [hereinafter “LEGAL PROCESS”].  
Other prominent contributions include ROBERT DAHL & CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 31 (1994) 
[hereinafter, KOMESAR, 1994]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001) [hereinafter, 
KOMESAR, 2001]; Neil K. Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: 
Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265; Neil K. Komesar, 
Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465; 
Neil K. Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative 
Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981). As discussed in Part II, infra, 
Komesar has developed especially important insights about how to compare institutional 
efficacy.  An entire symposium issue of the Wisconsin Law Review was recently devoted to 
his work, Symposium Issue: 30 Years of Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Celebration 
of Neil Komesar, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 266. 
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Institutional analysis answers these questions as a function of 
“participation.”  Those who have the most at stake will choose the 
institution that best serves their perceived needs.5  In the case of financial 
distress, for example, markets have historically been the dominant 
institutional choice.6  If, for example, Firm A defaults on its debt, it will 
most likely negotiate restructured debt contracts with its creditors.  This 
means that market participation solves the problem.  If Firm A cannot agree 
to revised terms with its creditors, some or all of them may go to 
bankruptcy court.  Stakeholders would then participate in a judicial process 
that either liquidates or reorganizes the debtor.7  Although far from perfect, 
the participatory qualities of markets and courts have generally made them 
the first line of defense in preventing individual incidents of financial 
distress from snowballing into financial crises. 
Until the crisis of 2008, regulators generally had little role in 
preventing or resolving financial distress—unless the distressed firm were a 
bank.8  If Firm A were a troubled bank, it would probably not negotiate 
with its creditors (most of whom would be retail depositors), or go to 
bankruptcy court, which is statutorily forbidden.9  Instead, bank regulators, 
likely the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), would seize the 
bank with little or no warning, and transfer its assets and liabilities to a new 
bank, or otherwise conserve the bank’s assets for the benefit of depositors 
and the government as deposit insurer.10 
Why a regulatory resolution for banks but not other types of firms?  
Again, participation is the answer.  Banks presumptively lend long (e.g., 
30-year mortgages) and borrow short (on demand) from widely dispersed 
retail depositors who lack the skill or resources to negotiate with the bank if 
it gets into trouble.  Institutional analysis teaches that the stakes here are 
 
 5.  See KOMESAR, 1994, supra note 4; see also infra Part II.B. 
 6.  See infra Part III.A. 
 7.  See infra Part III.B. 
 8.  Insurance companies and certain stock brokerages are also subject to regulatory 
resolution.  Because Dodd-Frank is modeled on the bank failure system, I do not discuss 
these other systems.  See infra Part III.C. 
 9.  11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2010). 
 10.  Of course, bank holding companies can go into bankruptcy.  The bank holding 
company (BHC) is not the bank itself, however: It is the parent corporation of the bank.  See 
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (“‘[B]ank holding company’ means any company which has control 
over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of 
this chapter.”).  If a BHC goes into bankruptcy, it will often do so in concert with an FDIC 
resolution of the bank subsidiary.  See, e.g., In re Washington Mutual, Inc., et al., No. 08-
12229 (Bankr. Del. Sept. 13, 2011).  The Supreme Court has assessed the relationship 
between bankruptcy and the regulation of bank holding companies in Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System of the U.S. v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 37-42 (1991) 
(sustaining Federal Reserve supervisory power over bankruptcy stay). 
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quite high, but skewed, because individual depositors are in no position to 
use market or judicial mechanisms to prevent or resolve bank failure.  
Market and judicial efforts at bank resolution would be much worse than 
regulatory resolution because these processes would reveal the bank’s 
condition.  This would cause panic and cascades of defaults—the very 
things the bank regulatory system was meant to prevent.  Thus, banks were 
“special,”11 and so required a special failure regime. 
The financial crisis changed this, first through regulators’ ad hoc 
market interventions and then through increased power given to regulators 
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (Dodd-Frank), the main reform following the crisis.12  These 
interventions mean that regulators increasingly crowd out markets and 
courts as institutional choices to prevent or resolve financial distress of 
large financial firms.  I characterize regulators’ expanding role in this 
context as “regulatory displacement.” 
New accounts of the crisis by key regulators such as Tim Geithner 
(then President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank)13 and Henry 
Paulson (then Secretary of the Treasury)14 show how this happened.15  
Regulators largely saw themselves as the first line of defense against 
financial crisis for large financial firms, whether banks or nonbanks, 
displacing markets and courts.  These firms in turn chose regulators 
because they believed that regulators would provide greater protection at 
lower individual cost than markets or courts. 
 
 11.  See, e.g., E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNESOTA, ARE 
BANKS SPECIAL? (1982), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/ar/ 
annual-report-1982-complete-text (arguing that banks play a unique role in the economy and 
thus warrant regulatory subsidies and constraints not appropriate for other types of financial 
firms). 
 12.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 13.  TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST, REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES, 133 
(2014). 
 14.  Hank Paulson, This is What it was Like to Face the Financial Crisis, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-12/hank-
paulson-this-is-what-it-was-like-to-face-the-financial-crisis (“People weren’t taking 
[Lehman Brothers CEO] Dick Fuld’s calls the weekend before Sept. 15, because Dick had 
been in denial for a long time.  As the CEO of Lehman Brothers, he had asked the New 
York Fed and the Treasury weeks earlier to put capital into a pool of nonperforming illiquid 
mortgages that he wanted to put in a subsidiary he called SpinCo and spin off.  We had 
explained that we had no authority to do that.  He thought somehow there was something 
the government could do to help”). 
 15.  See This American Life, The Secret Recordings of Carmen Segarra, CHICAGO 
PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 26, 2014) http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/ 
536/the-secret-recordings-of-carmen-segarra (revealing secret recordings of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Made by Carmine Segarra).  
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Consider, for example, Geithner’s response when he learned in March 
2008 that Bear Stearns, a large non-bank financial services firm, planned to 
commence a bankruptcy case: “Yikes!”16  Its “failure”—meaning a 
bankruptcy case—would “trigger[] a chain reaction of fear and uncertainty 
that could imperil the entire system.”17  Thus, when it subsidized JPMorgan 
Chase’s acquisition of Bear, Geithner acknowledged that the Federal 
Reserve (“Fed”) “cross[ed] a line [that it] had not crossed since the Great 
Depression, indirectly lending to a brokerage house that was supposed to 
function outside the bank [regulatory] safety net.”18 
In retrospect, this was a poor institutional choice.  If Bear Stearns had 
been forced to use market or judicial resolution processes, managers of 
other large financial firms would likely have done the same.19  Because 
Bear’s counterparties were not generally retail depositors, but other 
sophisticated financial firms, the participatory stakes would have been high 
but fairly evenly distributed across firms.  Market negotiations or judicial 
resolution would have redistributed losses in a more fair and efficient 
manner than regulatory intervention.  This would have been difficult and 
costly.  But, it would likely have reduced damage from the crisis, and 
promoted greater discipline going forward. 
Nevertheless, throughout the crisis, the Fed “crossed the line” 
repeatedly.  Worse, it did so unpredictably.  It crossed the line to bail out 
AIG, but simultaneously refused to do so for Lehman Brothers, which was 
forced into bankruptcy.20  The Fed and Treasury radically expanded de 
facto resolution powers through the crisis, largely immune from judicial 
scrutiny or the rule-of-law values courts tend to advance.21 
 
 16.  GEITHNER, supra note 13, at 149.  Although “only the seventeenth largest U.S. 
financial institution at the time”—and not a bank subject to Federal Reserve regulation—it 
was, in Geithner’s view “completely enmeshed in the fabric of the financial system.  It had 
four hundred subsidiaries.  It had trading positions with five thousand counterparties around 
the world.”  Id. at 150. 
 17.  Id. at 151. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 1 (quoting Sheila Bair) (“‘I think that the Bear deal 
set up an expectation for government intervention that was not really helpful’ . . . . Letting 
Bear Sterns fail would most likely have sent the right message to the rest of Wall Street . . . 
without creating [a] chain reaction . . . .”); FINAL REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION 280-291 (2011) [hereinafter “FCIC REPORT”], www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/ 
fcic.pdf (discussing the implications of the federal bailout of Bear Sterns). 
 20.  The story of the financial crisis—from Bear Stearns through AIG—is told by many 
authors.  A leading summary appears in the FCIC REPORT, supra note 19.  Of course, 
regulators did not act without political cover.  In particular, they sought and obtained 
Congressional support for their actions under the Troubled Asset Relief Program.  
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 111-343, §121(a), (f), 122 
Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790. 
 21.  It used special power to provide financing to non-bank financial services firms 
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Dodd-Frank was enacted on the promise that there would be “no more 
bailouts.”22  Few have faith in this promise.23  Its “orderly liquidation 
authority” gives regulators the power to seize a much broader range of 
firms than just banks—any firm that regulators deem to be “systemically 
important financial institutions” (SIFIs).24  While there is a very modest 
judicial check on this, David Skeel has observed that “Dodd-Frank 
enshrines a system of ad hoc interventions by regulators [] divorced from 
basic rule of law constraints.  The unconstrained regulatory discretion 
reaches its zenith with the new resolution rules for financial institutions in 
distress.”25  The current proposal to operationalize the resolution authority 
through a so-called “single point of entry”—which would give regulators 
the power to seize the parent company in a large corporate structure—does 
nothing to address this.26  Dodd-Frank codifies regulatory displacement. 
This Article uses institutional analysis to assess Dodd-Frank’s likely 
effect on financial distress among large financial firms.  Institutional 
 
under “unusual and exigent circumstances.”  Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 
(2006).  Section 1101 of Dodd-Frank amends this in an effort to constrain the Fed’s 
discretion to “bail out” non-bank financial services firms.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1101 (2010).  According to the 
Federal Reserve System, the amendment is “for the purpose of providing liquidity to the 
financial system and not to aid an individual failing financial company.”  Press Release, Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Emergency Lending Auth. (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_milestones.htm.  As discussed in Part I, 
few have confidence that there will be no more bailouts. 
 22.  According to the Federal Register’s summary of the purpose of the regulations 
issued under Dodd-Frank, “Regulations and other documents issued under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act are intended to promote the financial stability of the United States 
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to 
fail” bailouts of financial companies, and to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform, FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/dodd-frank-wall-steet-reform (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 23.  DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 11 (2011) [hereinafter, “SKEEL, NEW DEAL”]. (“The 
adjustments that purport to end bailouts and ad hoc interventions will do nothing of the kind.  
Although the restrictions on the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority are based on 
a valuable principle—that the Fed should not single out individual firms for rescue—they 
will not prevent future bailouts.”); VERN MCKINLEY, FINANCING FAILURE: A CENTURY OF 
BAILOUTS 283 (2011) (“Although the goal of ending taxpayer bailouts once and for all is a 
noble objective, the likelihood that the Dodd-Frank legislation has accomplished this is 
quite small.”); see also Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
409, 412 (2012) (“Any policy reaction to bailouts must deal with [the] complexity [that] 
bailouts are almost always the wrong policy approach, except when they are not.”).  
 24.  See infra note 176. 
 25.  SKEEL, NEW DEAL, supra note 23, at 9. 
 26.  Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of 
Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,614-24 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter, “SPOE 
Proposal”]. See also infra Part IV. 
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analysis makes possible three contributions to advance our understanding 
of how different institutional choices will affect future crises. 
First, institutional analysis shows that regulatory displacement is 
problematic not only because regulators threaten rule-of-law values but, 
more practically, prevents regulators from attacking the two pathologies 
that produce crises in the first place: market concentration and 
complexity.27  By forcing failed firms to consolidate, and promulgating 
mind-numbing regulation, regulators may actually exacerbate concentration 
and complexity.  The combination of concentration, complexity, and 
capture leave us in what Andrew Haldane calls a “doom loop,”28 an 
unsustainable cycle of boom and bailout. 
Second, institutional analysis provides a systematic way to compare 
the participatory capacities of markets, courts, and regulators to prevent 
and resolve financial crises, and thus to determine how regulatory 
displacement arises and becomes problematic.  Borrowing from literature 
on the “braiding” of formal and informal contracts, I show that in the 
context of financial distress, different institutions also braid.29  Markets and 
courts tend to reinforce one another through debt restructuring or asset 
liquidation.  In most cases, their participatory qualities should render them 
the first line of defense against crises, because they tend to reduce 
information asymmetries, effectively align incentives, and redistribute 
losses in ways that are, broadly speaking, more likely to be interpreted as 
legitimate.  Regulators, too, braid with markets, but this can be 
problematic, as it can reflect a “deep capture” that renders regulators the 
institutional preference of the regulated:  large financial firms.30 
Third, institutional analysis suggests a solution to the problem of 
regulatory displacement: courts.  As Hart and Sacks, early institutional 
analysts, observed many years ago, courts are the necessary counterweight 
to other institutions.31  I assess both a proposal to amend the Bankruptcy 
Code to add a “Chapter 14” for large financial firms, and a novel proposal 
 
 27.  See infra Parts I.B. &  I.C. 
 28.  Andrew Haldane, The Doom Loop, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2012, at 21, 
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/andrew-haldane/the-doom-loop. 
 29.  See infra Part III. 
 30.  See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
202–84 (2003) (introducing “deep capture” and providing evidence supporting the 
hypothesis); see also infra Parts I.C and III.C. 
 31.  See LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4 at 166 (“It is a postulate of the American legal 
system that whenever prior official determination is brought forward as a premise of 
decision, the power of the official or agency under the governing constitution to make the 
determination is open to judicial inquiry.”). 
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to subject directors of such firms to a heightened duty of oversight.32  While 
I find that the case has not yet been made to amend the Bankruptcy Code as 
proposed, rethinking directors’ duties in this context might produce better 
outcomes.  It could lead to more actively engaged directors, or to smaller 
and simpler financial firms, or (one hopes) both.  Although hardly a perfect 
solution,33 it also offers a way to better align incentives and governance in 
the management of large financial firms. 
The Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I describes the underlying 
problems of concentration and complexity, and explains why capture 
prevents regulators from solving them.  Part II develops a framework for 
comparing institutional responses to financial distress and crises.  Part III 
uses the framework from Part II to compare the capacities of markets, 
courts, and regulators to prevent and manage financial crises, and shows 
why large financial firms will tend to prefer regulators to markets or courts.  
Part IV looks more deeply at the problem of regulatory displacement as it is 
currently playing out in proposals to operationalize Dodd-Frank’s orderly 
liquidation authority, in particular through the so-called “single point of 
entry,” whereby regulators would seize only the parent entity in a financial-
firm complex.  Part V considers alternatives, assessing both proposed 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate the failures of large 
financial firms as well as a novel—and doubtless controversial—proposal 
that courts should more rigorously review directors’ discharge of their 
duties to oversee systemically important financial institutions. 
Institutional analysis cautions that no choice is ideal: we have only 
“imperfect alternatives,” as Neil Komesar has observed.34  Nevertheless, 
looking closely at the choices we have, and understanding their costs and 
benefits, are vital if we wish to better manage the financial system to 
prevent or ameliorate future crises. 
I. CONCENTRATION, COMPLEXITY, AND CAPTURE—THE DOOM 
LOOP 
A key observation of institutional analysis is that as problems become 
larger and more complex, the performance of all institutions will 
deteriorate, but at different rates.  Regulatory responses are typically 
thought to be more effective than courts or markets for problems that 
involve many people, great complexity, or both.35  The bank failure regime, 
 
 32.  See infra Part V. 
 33.   As discussed in Part V, it would severely tax courts, which are often ill-equipped 
to deal with large-scale, complex problems. 
 34.  KOMESAR, 1994, supra note 4. 
 35.  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 159 (“As numbers and complexity increase, 
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for example, can be justified on grounds that banks typically have many 
widely dispersed depositors who could neither negotiate nor litigate a 
solution to the bank’s collapse. 
Yet, the failures of very large, non-bank financial services firms may 
be different.  While financial crises are clearly problems of scale 
(“concentration”) and complexity, the political dynamics of financial 
services regulation will render regulators less effective at preventing crises 
than we might expect or hope, because regulators in this context are 
especially vulnerable to informational and other forms of capture.  This 
leaves us in Haldane’s “doom loop,” noted in the Introduction.36  This Part 
explains the doom loop as a function of three phenomena: industry 
concentration, complexity in financial transactions and their regulation, and 
political cycles that result in regulatory capture.  To the extent they are 
captured, regulators cannot be expected to reduce concentration or 
complexity.  Indeed, they may contribute to both. 
A. Concentration 
Concentration is a compact reference to the “too big to fail” (“TBTF”) 
problem: some financial services firms will be so large that the government 
will have no choice but to bail them out.  Dodd-Frank was enacted on the 
promise that there would be no more bailouts.37  To the extent that financial 
firms continue to grow inversely in number and size—fewer but bigger—
there is understandable fear that Dodd-Frank will fail. 
Title I of Dodd-Frank sets forth rules meant to constrain 
concentration.  In April 2014, banking agencies adopted a final rule 
requiring U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) to reduce their leverage.38  
 
judges . . . will be increasingly uncomfortable with what they do not know and with what 
surprises may be around the adjudicative corner.”). 
 36.  Haldane, supra note 28. 
 37.  As President Obama argued in support of Dodd-Frank: “We will not go back to the 
days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of the crisis, where too 
many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses . . . . [T]he old 
ways that led to this crisis cannot stand.  And the extent that some have so readily returned 
to them underscores the need for change and change now.  History cannot be allowed to 
repeat itself.”  Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Financial Rescue and Reform 
(Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-on-Financial-Rescue-and-Reform-at-Federal-Hall. 
 38.  BHCs with over $700 billion in total consolidated assets or assets under custody of 
at least $10 trillion must maintain a 6% supplementary leverage ratio requirement, and 
domestic top-tier holding companies must maintain a 5% supplementary leverage ratio 
requirement.  FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 92 (2014) 
[hereinafter “FSOC 2014 REPORT”], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/ 
Documents/FSOC%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf  
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According to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) created by 
Dodd-Frank, “[t]he rule is intended to constrain the buildup of financial 
leverage at the largest banking organizations and place additional private 
capital at risk before the Deposit Insurance Fund or government resolution 
mechanisms would need to be called upon.”39  Through the so-called 
“Volcker Rule”40 and stricter capital requirements,41 Dodd-Frank would 
also reduce firms’ leverage ratios.  In this respect, it may render firms at 
least somewhat less concentrated. 
Yet, observers have doubts about these efforts to reduce concentration 
or its risks.  As Haldane notes, even using capital controls more stringent 
than those envisioned by Dodd-Frank, “. . . an unexpected loss in a bank’s 
assets of just 4 per cent will be enough to render it insolvent.”42  A 2014 
report by the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
conceded that “recent regulatory reforms,” such as Dodd-Frank, “have 
reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the federal government would 
prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies.”43  The 
inference is that the market perceives very large banks to be too big to fail, 
and thus too concentrated.44 
The financial crisis of 2008 appears to have increased, not reduced, 
concentration.  “Our biggest banks are bigger now than they were in 2008,” 
a recent story in Forbes explains, “when the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program dedicated billions of taxpayer dollars to make sure they didn’t fail.  
In part, that has happened because the government forced the merging of 
Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, and 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Section 619 of Dodd-Frank added the so-called “Volcker Rule” (name for former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who is credited as its chief architect).  This would 
prohibit a “banking entity” from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or 
retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge 
fund or private equity fund.”  Dodd-Frank Act § 619, § 13(a)(1) (amending the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2010)). 
 41.  12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2011). 
 42.  Haldane, supra note 28. 
 43.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 14-621, LARGE BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT para. 1 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/665162.pdf.  This was the second of two reports on market expectations 
regarding government support for financial services firms.  See also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY 
IMPLEMENTED (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf..  
 44.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Big Banks Still a Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/business/big-banks-still-a-risk.html (describing 
government study showing that largest financial firms still enjoy an implicit government 
subsidy, usually considered evidence that such firms are considered too big to fail). 
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Wachovia into the largest banks, making them even larger.”45  Economist 
Philip Strahan thus notes that “[i]n the wake of the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008, it seems increased concentration in the financial industry has 
worsened the TBTF problem.”46  This suggests that Simon Johnson and 
James Kwak may be correct in arguing that we will ultimately be left with 
six “oligarch” banks.47 
The oligarchic quality of concentration stems from growing mutual 
dependence between financial firms and the government that would 
regulate them.  According to Alessandri and Haldane, the relationship 
between banks and government has long been deep and intimate,48 although 
the valence of influence has reversed over time.  Historically, banks were 
lenders and governments were borrowers.49 
For the past two centuries, the tables have progressively turned. As 
Alessandri and Haldane observe: 
 
The state has instead become the last-resort financier of the 
banks.  As with the state, banks’ needs have typically been 
greatest at times of financial crisis.  And like the state, last-resort 
financing has not always been repaid in full and on time . . . .  
Today, perhaps the biggest risk to the sovereign comes from the 
banks. Causality has reversed.50 
 
The chief evil of concentration is that it seems to lead inevitably to a 
government subsidy for large financial firms.  As John Coffee explains 
“[t]he larger the bank, the cheaper it could borrow, in part because all 
assumed that the government would not allow the bank to fail.  Seeing this 
 
 45.  Ted Kaufman, An Unhappy Birthday for Dodd-Frank: The “Too Big to Fail” 
Problem Gets Bigger, FORBES, Jul. 18, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/18/an-unhappy-birthday-for-dodd-frank-the-too-big-to-fail-
problem-gets-bigger. 
 46.  Philip E. Strahan, Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, 5 
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 43 (2013). 
 47.  See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 191 (2011) (discussing, in a chapter entitled “The 
American Oligarchy,” “the enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions and the 
corresponding increase in their economic and political power”). 
 48.  PIERGIORGIO ALESSANDRI & ANDREW G. HALDANE, BANKING ON THE STATE 1 
(2009) available at http://www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf. 
 49.  Id. at 1 (“As awareness of sovereign risk grew, banks began to charge higher loan 
rates to the sovereign than to commercial entities.  In the 15th century, Charles VIII of 
France paid up to 100% on war loans to Italian banks, which were at the same time charging 
Italian merchants 5-10%.  The Bank of England’s first loan to government carried an 
interest rate of 8% – double the rate at which the Bank discounted trade bills.”  (citations 
omitted)).  
 50.  Id. 
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subsidy, the shareholders and managers of such financial institutions 
rationally exploited it by taking on excessive debt and leverage.”51  This, in 
turn, presents problems of externality and moral hazard that few would 
defend.52 
B. Complexity 
Although Dodd-Frank has made a modest attempt to reduce 
concentration, it does nothing to reduce complexity.  “Complexity” in the 
context of the financial crisis refers to three specific phenomena: (1) 
transactional complexity, as is found in securitization and other derivative 
transactions; (2) structural complexity, as is evident in the many 
subsidiaries in which financial services (or other) firms may have an 
interest; and (3) regulatory complexity, as is reflected in the hundreds of 
pages of Dodd-Frank legislation, and thousands of pages of regulations 
implemented or proposed in support of Dodd-Frank.  As Professor 
Schwarcz has argued, complexity in the financial markets is “. . . the 
greatest financial-market challenge of the future.”53  It is both a cause and 
symptom of regulatory displacement. 
Transactional complexity reflects the development of securitization 
and other financial derivatives that involve multiple steps and parties 
endowed with highly contingent rights and responsibilities.54  A 
securitization generally involves at least three parties and two sets of 
transfers to effect what is, in essence, a capital-markets financing: the 
originator (e.g., a lender who creates a “financial asset”); a special purpose 
entity that purchases the financial asset; and an underwriter who pools the 
financial assets and issues securities whose value is determined in part or in 
whole by the predicted value of the financial assets.55  Any given offering 
of securities in a securitization could involve hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
 
 51.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1048 
(2012) [hereinafter, “Coffee, Political Economy”].   
 52.  Cf. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 483 (2011) 
(discussing the need for bailouts under certain circumstances). 
 53.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 213 (2009). 
 54.  Jonathan Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012) 
[hereinafter, “Lipson, Defining”]; Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in 
Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012) 
[hereinafter “Judge, Fragmentation”]. 
 55.  Lipson, Defining, supra note 54; Judge, Fragmentation, supra note 54. 
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of pages of disclosure.56  As Kathryn Judge has observed, this structure 
produces “fragmentation nodes” that contribute materially to the 
complexity of the financial system.57  Despite its complexity, securitization 
shows every sign of reviving.58 
Structural complexity refers to the number of entities (e.g., special 
purpose entities created in securitizations) that a large financial services 
firm may have.  For example, when it declared bankruptcy on September 
15, 2008, Lehman Brothers had 209 subsidiaries registered in twenty-one 
countries; they were also party to about 900,000 derivatives contracts.59  
Frequently, large financial firms are connected to one another through 
shared ownership in these entities, or interests in the assets these entities 
hold.  Interconnectedness among financial services firms significantly 
increases the likelihood of cascading failures, and crises, because the 
failure of a sponsoring (parent) bank may impair the value of investments 
held by other, healthy firms in the failing bank’s subsidiaries.60 
Regulatory complexity is perhaps the biggest problem because it 
means that the cure is, in fact, the disease.  Financial services regulation 
has followed a steep trajectory in volume: the Federal Reserve Act (1913)61 
and the Glass-Steagall Act (1933)62 are twenty-four and thirty-seven pages, 
respectively; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is sixty-six pages long and 
 
 56.  See The Gods Strike Back: A Special Report on Financial Risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 
13, 2010, at 2 (“A proper understanding of a typical collateralised debt obligation . . . would 
have required reading 30,000 pages of documentation.”). 
 57.  See Judge, Fragmentation, supra note 54, at 661 (“Four specific sources of 
complexity are highlighted: (1) fragmentation, (2) the creation of contingent and dynamic 
economic interests in the underlying assets, (3) a latent competitive tendency among 
different classes of investors, and (4) the lengthening of the chain separating an investor 
from the assets ultimately underlying its investment.”). 
 58.  See American Bankers’ Association, Asset-Backed Alert, Sept. 30, 2013, available 
at http://www.abalert.com/ranking.php?rid=2957 (reporting year-on-year average 16.5% 
increase in securitization as of Sept. 30, 2013); see also Securitization: It’s Back, 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21593457-
once-cause-financial-worlds-problems-securitisation-now-part-solution-its (reporting that 
securitization is now a common solution to international financial problems). 
 59. Michael Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, 
LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 3, 2014, 
available at http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/04/the-failure-resolution-of-
lehman-brothers-.html#.VTrcFmRdXlM. 
 60.  See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1267 (2013) 
[hereinafter, “Judge, Discipline”] (explaining that “in order to assess whether the types of 
risks a bank is exposed to are closely correlated to the risk exposures of other banks, a party 
must not only understand a bank’s risk profile, but also the risk profiles of other banks”). 
 61.  Federal Reserve Act, Pub.L. 63–43, 38 Stat. 251, codified at 12 U.S.C. 226 (Dec. 
23, 1913). 
 62.  Banking Act of 1933, Pub.L. 73–66, 48 Stat. 162, codified in portions of 12 U.S.C., 
(June 16, 1933). 
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Dodd-Frank weighs in at 849 pages.63  With a little more than half (about 
58.5%, or 231 of 395) of its required rulemakings finalized as of this 
writing, regulations implementing Dodd-Frank run over 13,000 pages.64  
These regulations have been developed in response to more than 27,000 
public comment letters on Dodd-Frank.65  This explosion in formal law 
mirrors and magnifies the transactional and structural complexity in the 
financial system. 
Scholars fear that complexity will stultify efforts to bring stability to 
the financial system.  As Schwarcz points out: 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving 
disclosure, but its efficacy will be limited.  Some financial 
structures are getting so complex that they are incomprehensible.  
Furthermore, it may well be rational for an investor to invest in 
high-yielding complex securities without fully understanding 
them.  Among other reasons, the investor simply may not have 
the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure to invest 
would appear to—and in fact could—competitively prejudice the 
investor vis-à-vis others who invest.66 
 
In its 2014 annual report, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
found that large financial services firms had modestly reduced their 
complexity and interconnectedness in 2013, based on the decreased number 
of assets where fair value measurement is based on unobservable inputs 
and the estimated size of potential fire-sale externalities.67  Yet, most 
 
 63.  See Mark J. Perry, Dodd-Frank Act, aka The 2010 Full Employment Act for 
Lawyers, Accountants, and Consultants, CARPE DIEM (Jul. 16, 2010, 9:07 AM),  
http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/09/dodd-frank-2010-full-employment-act-for.html.  
 64.  This is roughly the combined number of pages of regulation under titles 12 (Banks 
& Banking), 17 (Commodity and Security Exchanges) and 31 (Money and Finance) in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  Id.  Figures are as of July 18, 2014.  See generally DAVIS 
POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT (2015), 
http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report/. 
 65.  This is based on a search of publicly filed comments using the term “Dodd Frank” 
on regulations.gov, which produced as of October 6, 2014 27,551 individual public 
comments.  See REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp=25;po= 
0;s=dodd%252Bfrank;fp=true;ns=true (listing results for a search of publicly filed 
comments using the term “Dodd Frank” on regulations.gov, which produced, as of October 
6, 2014, 27,551 individual public comments).  
 66.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 819  (internal citations omitted). 
 67.  FSOC 2014 Report, supra note 38, at 116.  Indeed, sophisticated participants in 
government recognize the need, at least in theory, to reduce complexity, even if they cannot 
accomplish it in practice.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 7 
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observers are resigned to a future in which complexity is a growing aspect 
of financial life.68  It has grave systemic implications69 because it presses 
the limits of human cognition: it is simply not possible to make good 
judgments about risk, reward, and the resolution of distress in the face of 
great complexity.70 
C. Capture 
Among the most despondent observers is Roberta Romano, who fears 
that regulators will never be able to keep up, and are thus always likely to 
do more harm than good.71  Yet, she concedes, politicians (and, thus 
regulators) are nevertheless forced to take some action in response to 
crises, so the pattern is that regulation inevitably follows crises.72  But, 
political motives are not pure.  Rather, she argues that “policy 
entrepreneurs” foist “quack” legislation on the financial system, ignorant 
 
(2013) (stating that OIRA frequently rejected rules in order to “reduce cumulative burdens” 
and to reduce complexity). 
 68.  David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 40 J. CORP. L. 
55, 79 (2014) (“This problem of complexity making identification of an efficient outcome 
impossible or arbitrary and unreliable exists not just in the area of finance (as we have seen), 
but in a lot of other areas as well.”); Judge, Fragmentation, supra note 54, at 660 (“By 
focusing on sources of complexity that are likely to be present in other financial innovations 
that shift financing activities out of banks and into the shadow banking system, this Article 
suggests that these dynamics are likely to arise again.”). 
 69.  Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011) 
(describing systemic risk when banks take on complex risks); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic 
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 219 (2008) (discussing role of complexity in creating systemic risk). 
 70.  See generally J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 
(2008) (exploring the effect of a complex legal system); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical 
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406 (1996) (comparing the legal system with 
Complexity Theory). 
 71.  In Romano’s view, 
[T]he nub of the regulatory problem derives from the fact that financial firms 
operate in a dynamic environment in which there are many unknowns and 
unknowables and state-of-the-art knowledge quickly obsolesces.  In such a 
context, even the most informed regulatory response—which Congress’s 
reaction in the recent crises was not—will be prone to error and is likely to 
produce backward-looking regulation that takes aim at yesterday’s perceived 
problem, rather than tomorrow’s. . . . 
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN 87 (Cary 
Coglianese ed., 2014) [hereinafter, “Romano, Dark”]; see also Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1526–27 (2005) [hereinafter, “Romano, Quack”] (questioning quality of decision-making 
that went into SOX legislative process). 
 72.  Romano, Dark, supra note 71, at 88. 
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of, or indifferent to, the problems it may create.73  In this sense, politicians 
are captured by majoritarian bias.  To counteract this, she would require 
that financial regulation enacted in the wake of a crisis come with an 
automatic sunset provision, presuming repeal unless a later legislature 
reauthorized the law.74 
John Coffee has been among Romano’s strongest critics, arguing that 
she fails to understand the dynamics of legislation or the influence that 
sophisticated financial actors wield both during a crisis and in the 
deregulatory repose that follows.75  Drawing on the work of Mancur Olson, 
Coffee argues that “once a crisis subsides, more organized interest groups,” 
such as financial services firms, “regain the upper hand and begin to extract 
concessions, exemptions, or outright repeal.”76  Coffee then worries about a 
different kind of capture, one that reflects minoritarian bias. 
The term “regulatory capture” is routinely associated with George 
Stigler’s insight that regulators may have greater allegiance to those they 
regulate than to the public.77  Regulation, he argued, is a “good” that 
regulators sell to the highest bidder.  The regulated are willing to pay for it 
as a way to create barriers to entry for competitors (not to improve the 
quality of their own products), as this may be a more granular and 
politically palatable path to (anti)competitive advantage than an outright 
government subsidy.  (In the case of bailouts, it may be both).  The 
regulators are compliant for many reasons, including that they lack the 
resources and expertise to compete with—and thus to regulate—the 
regulated. 
Whether majoritarian or minoritarian, there is little doubt that capture 
presents a serious problem in the regulation of financial services.78  In the 
 
 73.  Romano, Quack, supra note 71, at 158.  Contra Robert A. Prentice & David B. 
Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received 
Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007) (viewing SOX optimistically). 
 74.  Romano, Quack, supra note 71, at 1600–02. 
 75.  Coffee, Political Economy, supra note 51, at 1026 (arguing that Romano’s 
proposed mandatory sunset provisions would be “an unnecessary fifth wheel, given the ease 
with which business interest groups can push back, repealing or downsizing legislation 
whenever they can make a colorable case that the legislation’s costs exceed its benefits”);  
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the 
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (2011). 
 76.  Coffee, Political Economy, supra note 51 at 1026 (referencing MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33–36 (2d 
ed. 1971)). 
 77.  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 
3, 3 (1971).  An excellent recent assessment of Stigler’s contribution appears in Christopher 
Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Capturing Regulatory Reality: Stigler’s The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CLASSICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Steven 
Balla, Martin Lodge & Edward Page eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).  
 78.  Perhaps the best early account of the symbiotic relationship between large financial 
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crisis, a (small) majority supported the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which became the basis for the massive regulatory “bailout” of 
(mostly) financial services firms.79  Thereafter, the small minority of 
financial services firms who benefitted from TARP aggressively sought to 
control the regulatory implementation of Dodd-Frank.  Through the 
laborious notice and comment process they have dulled Dodd-Frank’s 
impact and become further enmeshed with regulators.80  As Alan 
Greenspan has noted, “Financial regulators . . . know far less than private-
sector risk managers”; thus, “the open secret about regulation in the free-
market world is that regulators take their cues from private-sector 
practitioners.”81 
A strong example of this appears to be what Wendy Wagner calls 
“information capture”: “the excessive use of information and related 
information costs as a means of gaining control over regulatory decision[-
]making.”82  This is possible, and a well-known problem in the process of 
enacting rules under Dodd-Frank, with over 27,000 public comments, 
because “[t]he law does not permit the agency to shield itself from this 
flood of information and focus on developing its own expert conception of 
the project.  Instead, the agency is required by law to ‘consider’ all of the 
input received.”83 
To be sure, the foregoing glosses over much nuance in the study of 
regulatory capture.  Some, for example, question whether it exists or, if it 
exists, is a problem, because it may simply correspond with legislative 
 
firms and regulators appears in ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND 
THEMSELVES (2009).  
 79.  While Democrats largely supported President Bush’s TARP proposal, Republicans 
did not.  Sixty-five House Republicans voted in favor of H.R. 3997, the original House 
vehicle for the act.  After that legislation failed, on October 1, 2008, 34 Senate Republicans 
voted for H.R. 1424, the new vehicle for the act, and on October 3, 2008, 20 House 
Republicans voted for that bill.  President Bush, a Republican, subsequently signed it into 
law.  See House Vote #680 in 2008, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/ 
110-2008/h680 (last visited Apr. 24, 2015); Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 2nd Session, 
UNITED STATES SENATE,  http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_ 
vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=2&vote=00213#position.  TARP funds were also 
used to subsidize the automaker bankruptcies. 
 80.  For example, over 18,000 comment letters were submitted in response to the 
Volcker Rule alone.  See SCOTT A. CAMMAN, THE VOLCKER RULE: 2012 BANKING INST. 22 
(2012), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/banking/programs/dodd-frank 
combinedpresentations.pdf (powerpoint presentation); see also REGULATIONS.GOV, supra 
note 65 (discussing the volume of comments in response to Dodd-Frank).  
 81.  ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 524 (2008). 
 82.  Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010). 
 83.  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006)). 
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preferences for a particular industry.84  Regulators’ preference for one 
sector may reflect the delegation of larger popular will.85  Others worry that 
“deep capture,” in the words of Hanson and Yosifon, reveals 
“disproportionate and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful 
tend to exert over all the exterior and interior situational features that 
materially influence the maintenance and extension of that power—
including those features that purport to be, and that we experience as, 
independent, volitional, and benign.”86 
Whatever one may think of problems of capture, one thing is clear: 
through crises and recovery, both concentration and complexity have 
grown. Regulators cannot currently reduce either, and may worsen both.  
Thus, regulatory capture makes it implausible that regulators will be able to 
reduce or manage the two factors likely to contribute most to the next 
financial crisis. 
II. THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
If regulators appear unlikely to reduce concentration and complexity, 
what other institutional choices might be better, and why?  In order to 
answer these questions, it helps to understand the role of institutional 
analysis, because regulators are but one of several possible institutional 
choices in this context.  Although the term “institution” is subject to many 
definitions,87 institutions are, for purposes of developing a better 
understanding of financial distress and crises “large-scale social decision-
making processes,” in particular markets, courts, and regulators.88  This 
 
 84.  See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Redirect 
It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 177 (2011) (“it might 
be that the regulatory regime appears “captured” because the legislature that created this 
regime was itself captured by “special interests” and, as a result, has produced a regime 
predestined to captured results favoring those interests.”). 
 85.  See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, History: 150 Years of the OCC, 
available at http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/history/index-history.html (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2014) (discussing legislative support for National Bank Act and its role in 
protecting national banks); see also Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Miss., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873) 
(“National banks have been National favorites.”). 
 86.  Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30, at 218. 
 87.  As Jepperson points out, the following list of things could all in common 
understanding be considered “institutions”: “marriage, sexism, the contract, wage labor, the 
handshake, insurance, formal organization, the army, academic tenure, presidency, the 
vacation, attending college, the corporation, the motel, the academic discipline, voting.”  
Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, Institutionalism, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143, 144 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. 
DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 88.  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 31 (“I use the choice among these institutional 
processes to clarify basic issues such as the role of regulation, rights, governments, and 
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Section develops a three-part framework that summarizes the development 
of institutional analysis, in order to show how institutional choice affects 
the likelihood and severity of financial crises. 
A. The Contribution of Hart & Sacks: Institutional Settlement 
The analysis of institutional choice is not new,89 but scholars are just 
now beginning to consider its implications for financial failure.90  
Institutional analysis is rooted in the work of Henry M. Hart and Albert M. 
Sacks, who taught at Harvard Law School from 1932-196991 and 1952-
1991,92 respectively.  They famously observed that courts are but one of 
many institutions available to solve social problems: “different procedures 
and personnel of different qualifications invariably prove to be appropriate 
for deciding different kinds of questions,” they taught generations of law 
students.93  “So it is that every modern society differentiates among social 
 
capitalism.  These processes are alternative mechanisms by which societies carry out their 
goals.”). 
 89.  One could argue that it began at the end of the 19th century, when Holmes opined 
that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).  So stating, he recognized the institutional 
optionality embedded in promissory relations.  One can perform a contract one may have 
come to regret, in which case one has chosen the market as the institution to solve his or her 
problem.  If, instead, one chooses to pay damages, one is adverting directly or indirectly to 
courts, which (in general) determine whether damages must be paid and, if so, in what 
amounts.  
 90.  See Skeel, supra note 3 (using Komesar’s theory of institutional choice to assess 
responses to crises).  Work that implicitly recognizes institutional dimensions in the 
financial crisis includes: Judge, Fragmentation, supra note 54; RICHARD A. POSNER, A 
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY (2010); Eric A. Posner, & Glen 
E. Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st 
Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2012); Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 
815; Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1151, 1158–59 (2010); Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial 
Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1268 (2012).  This list is meant to be 
neither exhaustive nor critical.  Rather, these and many other good studies of the financial 
crisis recognize that markets alone—one institution—can no longer assure stability.  Yet, 
they fail to assess rigorously the various alternatives. 
 91.  Hart, Henry Melvin. Papers, 1927-1969: Finding Aid, HARVARD U. LIBRARY, 
available at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00107 (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 92.  Alfonso Narvaez, Albert M. Sacks, 70, Harvard Law Dean and Noted Teacher, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991. 
 93.  LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4, at 4. As Wisconsin’s Lloyd Garrison and Willard 
Hurst, early classroom teachers of institutional analysis wrote, “the various agencies of the 
law, such as legislatures, courts and commissions, are themselves often in conflict; and that 
they together are only one of the many means of social control, which includes churches, 
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questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other modes for 
others—e.g., courts for “judicial” decisions and legislatures for 
“legislative” decisions.”94 
Through their legendary teaching materials, Hart and Sacks had an 
enormous effect on generations of lawyers.95  Their starting point was not 
controversial:  social institutions exist to “maximiz[e] the total satisfactions 
of valid human wants, and its corollary of a fair division of the presently 
available benefits of group living.”96  The important question for Hart and 
Sacks was not the meaning of words such as “maximize,” “satisfaction,” 
“valid,” “fair” or “benefits.”  Rather, meaning would be invested in those 
terms procedurally, through what they called “institutional settlement.” 97 
“The principle of institutional settlement,” they explained, “expresses 
the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon 
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed.”98  The key for 
Hart and Sacks, therefore, was process quality:  If enough people accepted 
the process enough of the time, the result would probably be good enough, 
enough of the time.  While this would not necessarily produce ideal results, 
the alternative was much worse, a Hobbesian war of all against all.  
“[R]egularized and peaceable methods of decision,” they argued, were the 
“alternative to disintegrating resort to violence.”99 
 
schools, families, newspapers and so on.”  See LLOYD K. GARRISON & WILLARD HURST, 
LAW IN SOCIETY: A COURSE DESIGNED FOR UNDERGRADUATES AND BEGINNING LAW 
STUDENTS, 272 (rev. ed. 1941) (quoted in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An 
Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in Hart and Sacks, supra note 4, 
at  lxxiv).  Volume I of the 1941 edition of the Garrison/Hurst materials may be found at 
http://libcd.law.wisc.edu/hurst/SERIES%202/BOX%203/FOLDER%201/ ITEM%201.PDF. 
 94.  LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4. 
 95.  The materials were never published in their lifetimes.  William Eskridge & James 
Frickey, Commentary: the Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2046 
(1994).  They were later organized and published by Eskridge and Frickey as LEGAL 
PROCESS, supra note 4.  Hart and Sacks’ work has been called “the most influential work not 
produced in movable type since Gutenberg.”  Eskridge & Frickey, id. at 2031 (quoting J. D. 
Hyman, Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 1271, 1286 n. 70 (1976)). 
 96.  LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4, at 105. 
 97.  Id. at 4 (emphasis in original) (“[T]he principle of institutional settlement . . . 
builds upon the basic and inescapable facts of social living . . . namely, the fact that human 
societies are made up of human beings striving to satisfy their respective wants under 
conditions of interdependence, and the fact that this common enterprise inevitably generates 
questions of common concern which have to be settled, one way or another, if the enterprise 
is to maintain itself and to continue to serve the purposes which it exists to serve.”). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
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The concept of institutional settlement exists in a complex, reciprocal 
relationship with rule-of-law values, without which process would have 
little (or less) meaning.100  According to Eskridge and Frickey, Hart and 
Sacks “designated the judiciary as the guardians of rule-of-law values and 
envisioned the duty of judges to be the ‘reasoned elaboration’ of ‘neutral 
principles’ and legislative ‘purposes.’”101  They developed the now 
common distinction between “rules” and “standards” by which judges 
would have discretion to apply edicts from other branches (i.e., Congress) 
depending in part on the nature of the language and purpose of the law or 
rule.102  They would not, of course, be permitted unfettered discretion. 
A difficult question for Hart and Sacks was how courts should apply 
“neutral principles” when confronted with rules (or standards) that judges 
found problematic because indeterminate in application or recruited to 
address changing social conditions.103  Because they tended to prefer 
deference to legislative majorities or administrative experts, they were 
sometimes accused of creating an intellectual justification for opposition to 
landmark jurisprudence that deviated from the rule of (extant) law (e.g., 
Brown v. Board of Education).104  Yet, for Hart and Sacks, the rule of law, 
and the role of courts in deciding what the rule of law would mean, were 
critical protections against overreaching by other branches.  While courts 
may not be able to solve all problems, judicial review and negation play a 
powerful role in determining choices among, and the boundaries of, other 
social institutions. 
 
 100.  For example, in discussing the interplay between contract doctrine and federal 
agricultural regulation, they observed that “private decisions and official decisions” 
developed in ways that reflect a “chicken-and-egg relationship” that “def[ies] any facile 
description.”  Id. at 8-9. 
 101.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 95, at 2048 (quoting LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4, 
at 15 (“reasoned explanation”); 1407-26 (“principles”); 1178-1203, 1405-17 (legislative 
“purposes”)). 
 102.  See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557 
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forward: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-69 (1992); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING 
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE 104 (1991). 
 103.  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: 
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012) (discussing Hart and Sacks’ response to indeterminacy and 
uncertainty). 
 104.  See, e.g., Virginia E. Nolan & Edmond Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort 
Theory, 48 KAN. L. REV. 59, 68 (1999) (arguing that the “most influential articulation of” 
the “neutral principles” perspective “is found in the classic 1958 materials by Henry M. 
Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks.”). 
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Perhaps even more difficult are problems of scale and complexity.  
Lacking resources or the capacity to inflict violence, courts could only 
rarely tackle very large problems.  Scale was especially problematic, 
because courts have been tempted to address large social problems through 
mechanisms such as the class-action lawsuit and the nationwide injunction. 
While these mechanisms are sometimes effective in the short-run, other 
institutions, particularly legislatures, are more likely to have the 
institutional infrastructure to address large social problems.  “As numbers 
and complexity increase,” Neil Komesar argues, “judges . . . will be 
increasingly uncomfortable with what they do not know and with what 
surprises may be around the adjudicative corner.”105  And, yet, increasing 
scale and complexity place strain on all social institutions, and may thus 
leave courts wary of relying too heavily on other institutional actors, such 
as government or markets.106 
It is hard to overstate the influence of Hart and Sacks’ analysis.107  
Yet, they could not answer certain basic questions.  First, their analysis 
treated social goals as exogenous to the institutions through which the goals 
would be implemented.  How would we know, for example, what 
constituted “valid” human wants that social institutions should maximize?  
Because the analysis expected judges to be “neutral,” this was a question 
for other institutions, particularly politicians and regulators. Critics such as 
Duncan Kennedy were, however, suspicious and concerned that legal 
process was merely a mask for political bias.108 
Second, if social goals were exogenous, what role remained for formal 
law, as such?  The logic of the model led inexorably to the view that law 
was politics by other means.  Politics would reflect the biases of political 
participants, whether voters in an electoral process or participants in 
“contextualizing regimes,” in Sable and Simon’s terms, that advance 
 
 105.  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 159. 
 106.  Id. at 160 (“As numbers and complexity increase, courts want more help, but there 
is less help available.  We can expect tougher institutional choices with more compromises 
and more uncomfortable partnerships with these other institutions.”).   
 107.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 95. 
 108.  The most prominent challenge of this form comes from the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, whose literature is too voluminous to cite usefully here.  See, e.g., Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 
(1976) (“[S]ubstantive and formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement 
about how to apply some neutral calculus that will ‘maximize the total satisfactions of valid 
human wants.’  The opposed rhetorical modes lawyers use reflect a deeper level of 
contradiction.  At this deeper level, we are divided, among ourselves and also within 
ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and between radically 
different aspirations for our common future.”) (quoting LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4, at 
113); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). 
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special interests, such as those in financial services.109  Law, of whatever 
character, was limited in its ability to expose or remedy political biases 
because it was always a product of those biases.110  Regulatory capture is 
simply a strong example of this. 
Third, it offered no insight into how choices among institutions would 
or should be made.  It made little effort to compare rigorously different 
institutions’ attributes or their efficacy at solving particular problems.  Nor 
did it offer a descriptive or prescriptive theory about how choices would or 
should be made.  Of course, courts could not act on their own initiative, 
needing always a case or controversy to trigger involvement.  But, under 
what conditions would or should courts be a better institutional choice than 
markets or regulators or other institutional actors?  While few would 
quibble with the goal of institutional settlement—“legitimacy” in modern 
parlance111—more work would be needed in order to understand how 
different institutional choices would make this more likely. 
B. The Contribution of Komesar—Comparative Institutional Analysis 
That work would be undertaken by Neil Komesar.  Komesar made 
two significant contributions to institutional analysis.  First, he recognized 
that the minoritarian bias reflected in interest group analysis is only half of 
the story:  consistent with the political cycling of financial regulation 
described in Part I, there are important moments when political institutions 
will reflect majoritarian biases.  Institutional choices and performance are 
thus subject to what he calls a “two-force” model reflecting both 
minoritarian and majoritarian forces.  In the case of financial distress, 
 
 109.  See Sabel & Simon, supra note 103.  In a “contextualing regime” “officials charged 
with decisionmaking adopt the normative output of one or more specialized bodies of 
stakeholders.”  Id. at 1266. 
 110.  A word about the word “bias.”  I use it here to refer to preferences of stakeholders.  
Bias is an inevitable feature of stakeholder participation, and so is not necessarily 
problematic.  Bias becomes troublesome, however, when it produces net social costs 
(however measured) not internalized by active stakeholders.  Economists would refer to the 
product of bias as “externalities,” “transactions costs,” or “market failures.”  To the extent 
bias is problematic, better institutional choices will help to reduce—but never eliminate—
the costs of those biases. 
 111.  “Legitimacy” “posits that a system perceived as providing fair process and just 
laws promotes compliance with the law and respect for and deference to law enforcement 
authorities.”  See Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 
123 YALE L.J. 2236, 2239 (2014).  Important discussions of legitimacy in criminal law 
appear in e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD 
BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008); PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY 
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); TOM R. TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).  
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majoritarian preferences will dominate in the wake of a crisis, when public 
desperation or ire were at their peak; thereafter, as Coffee noted, well-
resourced minorities gain the upper hand in recovery.112 
Second, and perhaps more important, he developed a theory about 
how and why institutional choices are and should be made, through what he 
called a “participation centered” model.113  This recognizes that different 
institutions have different comparative advantages, and different 
stakeholders will choose the institution that best suits their interests.114  All 
institutions will perform imperfectly, but some will perform better than 
others depending on their characteristics (e.g., resources, expertise, and so 
on).  The important work is to compare the costs and benefits of the 
available choices. 
Using the simple example of tort law, Komesar showed how the 
distribution of stakes affects participants, and thus institutional 
performance and choice.115  Ordinarily, manufacturers will have higher per 
capita stakes in the sales of their products than will consumers.  In most 
cases, no single product will affect an individual purchaser as much as all 
sales will affect the seller.  If a product is defective, the manufacturer in 
many cases will want to repair or replace it.  The market is an effective 
institution for both sales of goods and for correcting occasional errors.  
Manufacturers thus prefer the market, which is unburdened by judicial or 
regulatory intervention.  Having the most at stake relative to consumers, 
that is the institution that will be chosen. 
If, however, the product turns out to be significantly harmful, there 
may be what Komesar calls a “shifted distribution.”  In a shifted 
distribution, “victims’ low distribution ex ante becomes a high uniform 
distribution ex post.”116  In these cases, courts may be the better 
institutional choice, because through the litigation process, harms will be 
measured and (roughly speaking) redressed.  As in the famous exploding 
 
 112.  See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 113.  KOMESAR, 1994, supra note 4, at 6.   
 114.  Participation, Komesar has argued,  
[I]s determined by the interaction between the benefits of that participation and 
the costs of that participation.  The benefit side focuses on the characteristics of 
the distribution of benefits or stakes across the relevant populations.  The 
central determinants are the average per capita stakes and the extent to which 
per capita stakes vary within the population.  The cost side focuses on the costs 
of participating in the institutions—transaction costs, litigation costs, political 
participation costs.  These costs generally fall into one of two broad 
categories—the cost of information and the cost of organizing collective action.  
KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 30. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. at 135. 
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Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,117 for example, courts will 
not be perfect, because many think the award there too high.  Nevertheless, 
a court’s ability to assess liability and provide a mass remedy made it a 
better choice than markets or regulators, which could not determine or 
remedy the harm caused.  Moreover, because judicial opinions are 
presumptively public they will have an important deterrent effect on other 
manufacturers, for whom the risk of multi-million dollar liability creates 
very high stakes. 
Two particular factors are likely to affect how participation occurs, 
and thus make Komesar’s theory of institutional choice especially useful in 
understanding financial distress: “complexity and numbers.”118  These 
largely map onto factors central to the financial crisis—concentration 
(scale) and complexity, discussed in Part I.  Komesar’s analysis generally 
assumes that courts are at a decided disadvantage given their inherent 
limitations.119  Yet, as discussed below, courts’ power to channel conduct 
through judicial opinions may be an important but under-appreciated tool 
in controlling concentration and complexity in large financial firms. 
Prior to a shift in distribution, markets and regulators tend to be better 
at managing problems of scale and complexity than courts.  When most 
debtors first default, for example they will probably use market 
mechanisms to resolve the problem, if possible.  If not, a shifted 
distribution may occur, in which case courts are likely to be the institution 
chosen by the stakeholders with the greatest interest in the outcome.  If, 
however, the shift in distribution presents significant disparities in 
bargaining power (scale) or complexity—as in bank runs—then other 
institutional actors, particularly regulators, may offer a more effective 
response.  It is only when we lack confidence in regulatory resolution that 
we must search for other institutional choices. 
Thus, as noted in the Introduction, the deeply symbiotic relationship 
between regulators and those regulated made it difficult for key regulators 
such as Geithner or Paulson to ignore pleas for help from large financial 
 
 117.  Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981). 
 118.  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 23 (“Numbers and complexity are variables of 
great import.  They generate shifts and cycles in law and rights.  Viewed through the lens of 
comparative institutional analysis, it is a pattern of shifts and cycles more compelling and 
intriguing than that generated by single institutional analysis.”). 
 119.  “[T]he courts’ ability decreases as the number of parties and the complexity of the 
issues increases.”  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 21.  “As the number of potential 
plaintiffs or defendants increases, the costs of bringing actions increase and the dynamics of 
litigation become more complex. . . . The problems of collective action that plague market 
transactions as numbers increase also plague adjudication: larger numbers mean more hold-
outs and greater likelihood of a failed settlement.”  Id.  
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firms, and force them to accept market or judicial resolution.120  Given 
regulators’ willingness to help, it would have been equally difficult for 
those who managed large, complex financial firms to resist regulatory aid 
for their firms.  Thus, regulators—acting on their own and later under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program—were an irresistible choice for the 
regulated.  Despite claims to the contrary, Dodd-Frank codifies many 
aspects of this dynamic.  As explained in Part III, this is likely to be a 
choice with significant social costs. 
C. The Contribution of Gilson, Sabel and Scott—“Braiding” 
Institutional analysis tends to study institutions in isolation: we 
compare the effectiveness of markets to courts, for example, abstracting 
away from the reality that they (or persons participating in them) are likely 
to interact in complex and subtle ways.  Yet, it seems implausible that 
institutions act in isolation, and Komesar himself recognizes that under 
stress they may “partner” with one another.121 
One way to understand their interactions is by analogy to contract 
literature on the “braiding” of formal and informal contracts.  Braiding is a 
concept developed in contract theory by Professors Gilson, Sabel and Scott.  
In an important 2010 paper, they argued that braiding bridges a long-
standing gap in contract theory about the role of “formal” and “informal” 
contract enforcement mechanisms.122  By “formal” they mean chiefly the 
work of courts, recruited by disappointed parties to enforce promises and 
provide a remedy for their breach.123  By “informal” they mean non-
judicial, interpersonal adjustments that often accompany default, and which 
resemble market-based (negotiated) solutions.124  To resolve the seeming 
 
 120.  See GEITHNER, supra note 13, at 158-61. 
 121.  KOMESAR, 2001, supra note 4, at 160. 
 122.  Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of 
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1377 (2010) [hereinafter, “Gilson et al., Braiding”].  They thus develop both prior work of 
their own, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for 
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
458–71 (2009), as well as that of pioneers at boundary between formal and informal 
contracting.  See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56–57, 62–63 (1963).   
 123.  Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 122, at 1379 (“Parties may choose by formal 
contract to enlist the judicial system to assess the parties’ performance of their specified 
rights and obligations and impose remedies in the event of breach.”). 
 124.  Id. at 1379 (“[P]erformance is encouraged and breach penalized by the cancellation 
of expected future dealings with the counterparty, by the loss of reputation (with the 
resulting reduction in future business with other potential counterparties in the relevant 
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dichotomy, they argue that, at least in certain classes of contracts—in 
particular, those involving innovation and new technologies—parties will 
choose not one or the other, but both: 
 
These [braiding] parties write contracts that intertwine elements 
of formal and informal contracting in a way that allows the 
parties to assess each other’s disposition and capacity to respond 
cooperatively and effectively to unforeseen circumstances.  In 
these contracts, the informal obligations interact within a formal 
governance structure that regulates the exchange of highly 
revealing information, but does not necessarily impose legally 
enforceable obligations to buy or sell anything.  All such 
contracts share a common focus: collaborative innovation in a 
world of heightened uncertainty.125 
 
“Braiding” is thus a “contract [that] combines formal and informal 
methods of enforcement.”126 The concept has captured academic 
imaginations.  It has been extended to analyses of secured credit,127 
contractual information sharing,128 and even the development of “special 
purpose acquisition corporations.”129 
“Braiding” in contract theory can be analogized to institutional 
performance.  Courts and regulators will tend to be more formal, in the 
sense that they are subject to more elaborately drawn rules and restrictions 
on their conduct.  Markets tend to be less formal, in the sense that parties 
have a broader range of discretion to choose the rules (if any) that govern 
their relationship.  So analogized, braiding offers two insights into how 
institutions prevent and resolve financial distress. 
First, Gilson, Sabel and Scott focus on contracts for innovation, in 
particular technology-related contracts, where they assume uncertainty to 
be quite high.  Like contracts for innovation, contracts for the resolution of 
financial distress—renegotiated debt contracts—involve high degrees of 
uncertainty and creativity best addressed through both informal and formal 
mechanisms, such as markets and courts.  Second, and more important, 
 
economic and social communities), or by an individual disposition toward reciprocity (and 
thus a willingness to reward cooperation and punish defection).”). 
 125.  Id. at 1382. 
 126.  Id. at 1383. 
 127.  Nicholas J. Houpt, Financing Innovation: Braiding, Monitoring, and Uncertainty, 
62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 337 (2012). 
 128.  Clayton P. Gillette, Tacit Agreement and Relationship-Specific Investment, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 128, 151-52 (2013). 
 129.  Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution 
of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 868-70 (2013).  
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institutions themselves braid in the prevention and resolution of financial 
distress. Both are explored in the next Part. 
III. A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS SYSTEMS 
The prior Part developed a three-step institutional framework: (i) per 
Hart and Sacks, institutional settlement (legitimacy) is the goal; (ii) per 
Komesar, scale and complexity will influence institutional competence, 
while participation will determine institutional choice; and (iii) by analogy 
to Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, institutions braid in addressing financial 
distress.  This Part applies the framework to compare the three major 
institutional choices available in the prevention and resolution of financial 
distress: markets, courts, and regulators.130  It explains why markets and 
courts will often be better first-line responses, even though they are being 
displaced by regulators.  It also explains why large financial services firms 
would choose regulatory resolution as it is currently proposed. 
A. Market Resolution 
There is a tendency to assume that financial distress is a problem that 
courts—in particular bankruptcy courts—chiefly solve.131  But this is a law-
(and lawyer-) centered view that is incomplete.132  Rather, debtors and 
creditors are far more likely to renegotiate financial distress inter se—or 
simply to walk away—than to use any other single institution.133  This 
institutional choice has important benefits, which often outweigh its costs. 
 
 130.  Needless to say, other social institutions may matter in this context, as well.  In 
particular, “communities” may form social decision-making processes that influence the 
prevention and resolution of financial distress. Some of these communities are discussed in 
Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609 (2009) 
[hereinafter, “Lipson, Shadow”] (describing rise of close-knit networks of professional 
distress investors) and Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor 
Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035 (2011) [hereinafter, “Lipson, Governance”] (same).  
 131.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 94 (6th ed. 2009) (“[B]ankruptcy is the chief legal relief of choice 
for most debtors and creditors when financial disaster strikes”); Stephen J. Lubben, 
Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2011) (“Save for 
when the Dodd-Frank Act’s new resolution authority applies, [C]hapter 11 remains the 
primary instrument for resolving financial institutions. Unless a specialized regime is in 
place, such as those for banks or insurance companies, [C]hapter 11 will apply.”). 
 132.  An early recognition that courts did not have to be the chief institutional choice for 
financial distress appears in DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY 147–72 
(1971).  They argued for an administrative resolution mechanism for individual debtors, in 
order to reduce the cost and delay of individual filings in bankruptcy courts. 
 133.  The work of Nini, et al., for example, shows that fewer than 7% of distressed 
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As in other contexts, the institutional choice will turn in large part on 
the number of participants and the complexity of their stakes.  In the 
simplest case—a single debtor and creditor—only a market transaction is 
needed.  It is unlikely that any other institution would offer superior 
prevention or resolution mechanisms.  While creditors may have to use the 
state court collection process to enforce their claims, this would seem to be 
a fairly unusual result given the ease with which debtors and creditors can 
either rewrite the debt contract or the debtor can cede its assets to the 
creditor (“walk away”).134  In most cases, judicial process in binary debtor-
creditor disputes is not cost justified, and so is not chosen by either party. 
As the number and/or complexity of stakeholders and claims grow, 
however, judicial process becomes more appealing.  The debtor may be 
recalcitrant in negotiations or some creditors may hold out for a better deal.  
The debt contracts may be interwoven in complex ways that leave the 
parties in doubt about their relative rights.  When a debtor with many 
creditors in complex contracts defaults, there will be a shifted distribution 
of stakes.  Prior to default, the debtor’s many creditors may have paid little 
attention to their rights against the debtor, or inter se.  After a general 
default, creditors will need to understand and act on those rights. 
In the first instance, this shifted distribution will usually produce the 
classic “workout” negotiation, which will more likely than not result in 
resolution.  Yet, because it always occurs in the shadow of some court—
either a state court for collection purposes or a federal bankruptcy court for 
broader and deeper defaults—it is important to recognize that markets and 
courts “braid” in this context.  Here, braiding means that neither informal 
renegotiation nor formal judicial resolution (e.g., through judgment and 
execution) is likely to be the exclusive institutional choice.  Rather, each 
reinforces the other.  Markets will be the dominant institution, with courts 
performing a second, in terrorem, role.  The promise of contractual 
 
publicly-traded firms (defined as those announcing a debt-covenant default) declare 
bankruptcy or liquidate through a judicial proceeding.  See Greg Nini, David C. Smith & 
Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1713, 1724-27 (2012).  For smaller firms, the percentage is higher, nearly 10%.  In 
2010, for example, 690,504 businesses closed (some of which may have been public firms), 
while 56,282 businesses (less than 10%) went into bankruptcy. See Douglas E. Castle, 
Business Restructurings, Turnarounds And Remobilization Of A Nation’s Economy, 
DOUGLAS E. CASTLE: BLOG, July 22, 2013, http://douglasecastleblog.com/2013/07/22/ 
business-restructurings-turnarounds-and-remobilization-of-a-nations-economy/ 
(reproducing the American Bankruptcy Institute’s quarterly data for business bankruptcy 
filings from 1994 to 2012). 
 134.  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted in all states, permits self-help 
repossession of collateral following default.  U.C.C §§ 9-601, 9-609 (2010). 
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renegotiation forms the “carrot”; the threat of judicial action is the 
“stick.”135 
This kind of participation has three important benefits.  First, the 
parties are better positioned to make judgments about their capacity to 
commit credibly to a revised payment schedule (in the case of a debtor) or 
to absorb a loss (in the case of a creditor) than other institutional actors.  
This will, on average, lead them to align their incentives with their 
capacities to perform, if they believe performance is plausible.  This, in 
turn, is likely to reduce both economic (e.g., transactions) and normative 
(e.g., moral hazard) costs. 
Second, it is an ex ante solution, in the sense that it comes prior to 
other institutional involvement.  Because preventing (or quickly resolving) 
individual cases of distress is the first line of defense in preventing crises, 
market resolution has a greater capacity to avoid the need for ex post 
resolution efforts, e.g., through bankruptcy or regulatory intervention. 
Third, market resolution can reflect an important kind of institutional 
settlement.  Absent significant information asymmetry or externalities, a 
consensual workout is one that most would recognize as “duly” authorized 
by the parties directly involved.  If debtors and creditors of roughly 
comparable bargaining power renegotiate defaulted debt contracts, it would 
be hard to see who loses—especially if this avoids cascading losses that 
could lead to a crisis. 
Yet, institutional analysis requires us to assess both the benefits and 
the costs of any institutional choice, and market resolution is not perfect.  
First, information asymmetry can be highly problematic in this context.  As 
I have observed elsewhere, the pre-bankruptcy workout process can be 
fraught with sharp dealing.136  Investors, for example, may hold short 
positions through credit default swaps (CDS) that pay off if the debtor’s 
workout fails.  This presumptively creates incentives to undermine the 
workout.  Because such positions are not publicly registered, other 
stakeholders would not know how to bargain around them.137  Such 
positions may not rise to the level of fraud, yet they will create opacity and 
suspicion that can make market resolution prohibitively costly.138  Because 
 
 135.  See Lipson, Governance, supra note 130, at 1046-49 (describing dynamics of 
prebankruptcy workouts). 
 136.  See Lipson, Shadow, supra note 130, at 1653-59 (discussing creditors’ temptations 
to engage in short-selling and other practices that may harm distressed debtors); Lipson, 
Governance, supra note 130, at 1051-59 (describing sharp practices in pre-bankruptcy 
workouts). 
 137.  Dodd-Frank has proposed to create clearinghouses for certain such instruments.  
But, as with other aspects of Dodd-Frank, there are concerns that regulation will not keep 
pace with transactional developments.  See, e.g., Romano, Dark, supra note 71, at 87.  
 138.  Lipson, Defining, supra note 54, at 1253 n.77 (2012) (discussing the confusion 
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they are inherently complex instruments to begin with—and can involve 
enormous sums of money—information failures of this sort can cause asset 
values to plummet precipitously.  It is not surprising that the information 
asymmetry created by short positions made renegotiating pre-crisis 
transactions difficult.  It may also have contributed to panic in the market 
and a rapid decline in asset values. 
Second, as debtors grow in scale and complexity, the problem of 
holdouts becomes more acute.  A debtor can only work out debt privately if 
all or a vast majority of creditors agree.  A debtor with publicly-traded 
bonds, for example, cannot generally restructure the bonds, such as by 
reducing payments, without the consent of all or most bondholders.139  
Given the rise of distressed-debt investing, it is not surprising that 
sophisticated creditors may be tempted to hold out for a better deal, foiling 
market-based resolution. 
Third, there are transaction costs.  Corporate restructurings usually 
involve professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and bankers, who do 
not work for free.  Moreover, given the uncertainty that is always present in 
restructurings, the parties could restructure the debt only to see the debtor 
default again.  This would either require further negotiations or, more 
likely, a bankruptcy filing. 
Finally, there may be social costs not internalized by the principal 
parties to the workout.  Some stakeholders may have little or no say in the 
outcome of the restructuring, but are nonetheless affected by it.  The classic 
examples will be tort creditors, low-level, non-union employees and 
smaller trade and tax creditors of the corporate debtor.140  From an 
institutional perspective, we would say that these creditors may have small 
stakes relative to those of large creditors, but nevertheless, the loss of a job 
or pension means a great deal to that creditor.  The workout process may 
not protect these stakeholders, because they will lack the resources or 
sophistication to participate in it.  Yet if, as is entirely plausible, a 
restructuring results in outsourcing or downsizing, these stakeholders 
would surely be adversely affected by the negotiations of the larger 
stakeholders. 
The market cannot correct for all of these costs.  Indeed, the presence 
of these costs—from holdouts to externalities—is sometimes good reason 
 
created by short positions in the “Abacus” and “Magnetar” transactions that were 
controversial in the financial crisis).  
 139.  Lipson, Governance, supra note 130, at 1055. 
 140.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the 
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1245-51 (2003) (discussing 
effect of distress on “non-adjusting” creditors such as tort creditors, tax authorities, and 
trade creditors). 
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to resort to other institutions, in particular bankruptcy courts.  Yet, the 
important question is not whether market-based solutions are optimal or 
costly, but how the costs and benefits of this choice compare to the costs 
and benefits of other available choices.  When stakeholders can participate 
in resolution in some meaningful way that produces institutional 
settlement, other institutions are unlikely to do a better job.  Other 
institutions will outperform the market only when participants are, in 
aggregate, unable to come to some reasonably fair and efficient resolution 
of financial distress. 
B. Judicial Resolution 
It is at this point that courts and markets flip, with courts (usually 
bankruptcy courts) becoming the dominant institution and markets playing 
a secondary role.  Bankruptcy offers essentially two models: straight 
liquidation (usually under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code) or 
reorganization (usually under Chapters 11 or 13), which are in essence 
moderately coerced workouts. 
Both models depend on several basic judicial mechanisms.  First, a 
stay is automatically imposed on most collection efforts (as discussed 
below, derivatives contracts are an important exception).141  Although this 
halts one form of participation—the collection suit—it actually promotes 
more direct participation because it channels all stakeholders into a single 
forum, where they can more efficiently assess, and negotiate, their relative 
rights against the debtor.  Second, an estate is created that is composed of 
all of the debtor’s property.142  This preserves the debtor’s assets with the 
goal of maximizing recoveries, whether through reorganization or 
liquidation. 
Third, the level of participation in resolution will largely be 
determined by the size and complexity of the debtor involved.  Consumer 
cases will usually be liquidations under Chapter 7 or “wage earner” plans 
under Chapter 13.  Neither involves voting by creditors.  A corporation 
with meaningful going concern value is likely to propose a plan of 
reorganization under Chapter 11, on which creditors would get a vote.143  
Presumptively, Chapter 11’s more elaborate disclosure and voting rules 
create opportunities for greater stakeholder participation. 
 
 141.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 142.  11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 143.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), “impaired” classes of creditors are entitled to vote on 
the plan.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129, a court cannot approve the plan unless it has the requisite 
number and amount of creditor support.  There are, of course, variations on this, but the 
details are unimportant to the institutional analysis presented here. 
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As in market resolution, judicial resolution involves braiding, here 
chiefly with markets.  Thus, in the corporate context, the workout 
negotiations that began and failed prior to bankruptcy are highly likely to 
resume once the debtor enters bankruptcy.  These negotiations perform 
filtering and sorting functions that enable bankruptcy courts to manage the 
large and complex cases that they are often asked to resolve.  Institutional 
braiding provides the flexibility to produce more nuanced results than 
either judicial or market-based resolution could produce in isolation. 
Moreover, unlike judges in courts of general jurisdiction, bankruptcy 
judges are usually expert in the problems that are asked to deal with.  Most 
large corporate bankruptcies, for example, are filed in the Southern District 
of New York or the District of Delaware.144  The clustering of complex 
cases in these jurisdictions has likely contributed to the expertise of the 
judges in these courts, who are widely recognized as among the nation’s 
most sophisticated.145  These judges are aided by an extremely sophisticated 
bar, which also benefits from repeat play.  While these judges are hardly 
infallible—and some worry that they defer too readily to the bar and 
“insiders” in the process146—there is little question that they are not 
daunted by the size or complexity of the cases before them. 
Judicial resolution in bankruptcy has other benefits.  First, to the 
extent that disputes are actually litigated, they will be adjudicated using 
ordinary rule-of-law mechanisms.  The common law, precedent, the rules 
of proceeding and proof all apply in bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy courts write 
reasoned, published opinions that affect both the parties to the dispute and 
the incremental development of the law.  Bankruptcy courts’ decisions are 
subject to appellate review, more or less, as would be the case for other 
federal courts.147  Thus, to the extent the judiciary ever has the capacity to 
produce institutional settlement, so, too in bankruptcy. 
Second, bankruptcy reorganization can be a reasonably transparent 
process.  This is due largely to the fact that it is subject to court 
supervision, so most important matters will be subject to pleading and 
judicial approval.148  Because pleadings are presumptively public, the 
process itself will be far less opaque than a market-based resolution, which 
is ordinarily subject to no mandatory disclosure (outside of federal 
 
 144.  Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 145.  LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) [hereinafter, “LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE”]. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 148.  11 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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securities laws, if they apply).  Transparency contributes to the legitimacy 
of bankruptcy resolutions. 
The third, and perhaps most important, benefit of this institutional 
interaction, is its ex ante effect: the costs of the bankruptcy process—
transaction costs, delay, etc.—may be the most important incentive parties 
have to work out financial distress consensually, in lieu of bankruptcy.  
Bankruptcy is, in other words, the legal process in whose shadow market 
resolution typically occurs. 
Yet, as with all institutional choices, choosing bankruptcy has costs.  
First, the reality that large, complex cases are concentrated in two districts 
has led many to worry that the judges in these courts are captured by the 
bar, much as regulators may be captured by sophisticated financial firms.149  
While there is not the kind of “revolving door” that worries many about 
regulation, the transparency that can give bankruptcy its legitimacy also 
produces a deluge of information that no judge can fully absorb. Judge 
Peck, who presided over the Lehman Brothers case, may have been just as 
vulnerable to “information capture” as financial regulators, given the 
thousands of pages in the examiner’s reports, disclosure statements 
supporting reorganization plans, and other pleadings in that case.  The 
volume of information, in turn, will place pressure on judges to rely more 
on counsel in the cases before them.  The lawyers may, in turn, feel 
pressure to get a reorganization plan approved once the parties have come 
to agreement.  Thus, the worry is that judges in Manhattan and Wilmington 
defer too much to the lawyers before them, confirming reorganization plans 
that are not truly feasible.150  Infeasible plans may produce “serial 
bankruptcies,” such as those of US Airways (three bankruptcy cases), 
which are presumptively wasteful. 
Second, bankruptcy can depress values.  There is concern that Chapter 
11 has become little more than a venue for the sale of distressed business, 
mergers and acquisitions by other means.151  Bankruptcy sales—like all 
judicial sales—are unlikely to produce as much value as an arms-length, 
negotiated sale out of court.  This has led some to worry that bankruptcy 
increasingly produces “fire sales” rather than reorganizations “in place,” 
 
 149.  LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 145, at 137-81 (discussing various 
allegedly forms of “corruption” among certain bankruptcy courts). 
 150.  “Feasibility” is one of the standards required to confirm a reorganization plan.  11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  It means that the court has concluded that the debtor under the plan is 
not likely to need further bankruptcy proceedings. 
 151.  See Jonathan C. Lipson & Christopher diVirgilio, Controlling the Market for 
Information in Reorganization, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. J. 647, 653 (2010) (“Instead of 
providing a substitute for a market sale, Chapter 11 now serves as the forum where such 
sales are conducted.”). 
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which are generally thought to preserve greater value.152  Many are 
cautioned by the low price at which Barclay’s snapped up Lehman 
Brothers’ brokerage business only several days into the case.153  Jacoby and 
Janger note that Chapter 11 has come to recognize a “speed premium” that 
may benefit purchasers more than the reorganizing debtor whose assets are 
being sold.154 
Thus, bankruptcy is not a perfect institutional choice, but under many 
circumstances will be better than alternatives.  As explained in the 
Introduction, there is good reason to believe that if Bear Stearns had been 
permitted (or forced) to go into bankruptcy in 2008, the crisis would have 
had very different characteristics.  Tim Geithner is likely correct that a Bear 
Stearns bankruptcy would have been problematic.155  But, the very fear that 
such a bankruptcy would have created should have led market 
participants—that is, the CEOs of other large financial firms—to begin the 
hard work of renegotiating amongst themselves.  So far as we can tell, this 
did not occur.  Instead, as explained in the Introduction, they sought (and 
mostly received) support from regulators.  But, as shown in the next Part, 
regulators should be a last line of defense—not the first. 
C. Regulatory Resolution 
Regulatory resolution in the United States has historically been limited 
to specialized industries, in particular commercial banks, which are not 
permitted to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.156  Instead, they are 
subject to a well-established federal regime, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act (“FDI Act”).157  Moreover, Dodd-Frank’s process for resolving what it 
 
 152.  See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 3-4 (2007) (discussing how reorganization can double value as compared to selling). 
 153.  One day after Lehman went into bankruptcy, Barclays purchased such core 
Lehman assets as its prime brokerage, investment bank and headquarters for about $1.3 
billion.  Judge Peck was quoted as saying “I have to approve this transaction because it is 
the only available transaction.”  See Judge approves $1.3bn Lehman deal, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
20, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7626624.stm. 
 154.  See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price 
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2013). 
 155.  See discussion supra note 16. 
 156.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), (d) (2006) (banks may not be debtors under Bankruptcy 
Code).  American banks have long been barred from commencing a bankruptcy case.  See 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541 § 4(b), 30 Stat. 544, 547 (explaining “who may become 
bankrupt” under the Act).  
 157.  The relevant statutory provisions of the FDI Act are 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1825.  See 
also Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufmann, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency 
Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 145 (2007).  Insurance 
companies are generally regulated at the state level, so their resolution procedures are 
subject to greater variation. 
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calls “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs) was expressly 
modeled on the federal bank resolution model.158 
Under federal banking law, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) or other designated regulator may seize a bank that is “critically 
undercapitalized,” a minimum of two percent equity capital to total 
assets.159  When a bank is insolvent, the bank’s charter will be revoked and 
the primary regulator will appoint a conservator or receiver to administer 
the insolvency proceedings.160  If the FDIC is appointed receiver, it has 
complete power over the assets and liabilities of the failed bank.161  These 
powers are largely outside the judicial system and few FDIC decisions are 
subject to judicial review.162 
When appointed receiver, the FDIC must decide what to do with the 
failed institution.  In theory, it has a range of options.  It can “liquidate the 
institution, organize a new bank or a temporary bridge bank, take over 
some or all of the assets and liabilities, or arrange a merger or purchase of 
assets and assumption of liabilities.”163  In fact, federal law requires the 
FDIC to choose a resolution method that imposes the “least cost on the 
insurance fund, unless it determines that doing so is necessary to avert 
systematic risk.”164  Data indicate that in most cases, the FDIC found a 
 
 158.  As Assistant Treasury Secretary Michael Barr said in testimony on behalf of the 
legislation that became Dodd-Frank: “Our proposal does little more than apply to” 
systemically important non-bank institutions “the same model that Congress has developed, 
that the FDIC has executed, and that courts have respected, over the course of more than 
three-quarters of a century.”  Press Release, Assistant Secretary Michael Barr Written 
Testimony, House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative 
Law (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg327.aspx; see also Paul L. Lee, The Dodd Frank Act Orderly Liquidation 
Authority: A Preliminary Analysis and Critique, 128 BANKING L.J. 771, 786 (2011). 
In what could be seen in hindsight as a political misstep, the Treasury 
Department noted in its press release that the new authority was modeled on the 
FDIC’s existing resolution authority for depository institutions and on the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency’s resolution authority for government 
sponsored entities.  The indirect allusion to the conservatorship of treatment of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exposed the Treasury to the criticism that its 
proposal would provide a source of ongoing federal assistance to other 
companies on financial life support.   
Id. at 784.  As noted below, regulators have since then modulated this message somewhat. 
 159.  Bliss & Kaufmann, supra note 157, at 156. 
 160.  Id.; William J. Fellerhoff & Robert D. Aicher, Avoidance Powers Available to the 
FDIC in a Bank Insolvency, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 59, 61 (1991). 
 161.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5). 
 162.  Bliss & Kaufmann, supra note 157, at 160. 
 163.  Lubben, supra note 131, at 1266. 
 164.  Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1003 (2010). An exception has only been invoked once in the 
past decade.  Id. at 1003-04.  
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bank that was willing to assume some or all of the failed bank’s liabilities 
and purchase some or all of the failed bank’s assets, typically through a 
transaction known as a “purchase and assumption” (P&A).165 
In a P&A, the government secures the commitment of a “healthy” 
bank to take over the assets of the troubled bank.  This is how the FDIC is 
able to “seize the bank at the close of business on a Friday, and some of the 
failed bank’s offices will reopen as part of the acquiring bank the following 
Monday.”166  This means, in essence, that the government and markets 
must work together—again, a kind of “braiding”—quickly and quietly to 
resolve the bank’s distress.  Courts effectively have no role here. 
Commentators on bank insolvency procedures have suggested various 
policy reasons for the procedures outlined above.  In theory, they create a 
resolution before an “actual event of economic insolvency or financial 
default.”167  This advances one very obvious—and vital—policy goal: the 
prevention of bank runs.168  While it is easy to exaggerate the severity of 
bank panics, they nevertheless have a long history of worrying public 
officials.  One observer characterized the English bank panic of 1825 as 
follows: “‘A panic seized upon the public, such as had never been 
witnessed before: everybody begging for money—money—but money was 
hardly on any condition to be had.’”169  Common images of bank panics 
include lines of anxious depositors clamoring to withdraw their savings 
from banks that suffer from what economists euphemistically call a timing 
problem.  If you have seen the movie It’s a Wonderful Life, you know that 
there is nothing wonderful about bank failures. 
Another major policy goal is the need to protect the FDIC’s insurance 
fund.170  This is reflected in Congress’ requirement that the FDIC choose a 
resolution plan that has the lowest impact on the fund unless the FDIC 
determines that doing so is necessary to avert systemic risk.171  
Foreshadowing Dodd-Frank’s distributed-authority resolution procedures, 
the FDIC may deviate from the least-cost method only with the approval of 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Secretary, and they 
 
 165.  Id. at 1002. 
 166.  Id. at 989. 
 167.  Bliss & Kauffman, supra note 157, at 152. 
 168.  See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That it Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 
469, 491 (1992) (explaining why bank runs deserve special regulation); Diamond & Dybvig, 
supra note 2, at 404 (discussing regulation and prevention of bank runs). 
 169.  KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 2, at 105 (quoting THOMAS JOPLIN, CASE FOR 
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PANIC, IN A LETTER TO THOMAS 
GISBOURNE, ESQ. M.P. (London: F. Ridgeway & Sons, n.d. [after 1832], pp. 14-15)). 
 170.  Swire, supra note 168, at 474. 
 171.  12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
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must consult with the President.172  Not surprisingly, it has been invoked 
rarely in cases of bank failures.173 
It would appear that the bank failure system is a reasonable 
institutional choice given the nature of banks and the institutional 
alternatives.  If the goal in the first instance is to instill confidence in the 
banking system, and thus to broaden participation in it at the retail level, 
deposit insurance was probably the most effective mechanism available.  
While markets could have invented this, it appears that they either did not 
do so in the 1930s, or simply lacked government’s credibility as ultimate 
insurer.  While markets are secondarily important in the event a failed bank 
is the subject of a P&A, regulators will call the shots, acting by proxy both 
in lieu of the managers they have displaced and the retail depositors they 
are assigned to protect. 
Given this dynamic, it is not surprising that courts play an attenuated 
role in bank failures.  While courts certainly could supervise bank 
failures—and do so in many nations174—there are sound institutional 
reasons for leaving that choice with government.  Among other things, the 
bank regulatory system appears to depend on a very constricted flow of 
information and prompt corrective action.  Unlike courts, regulators do not 
generally make reports about troubled banks available in real time 
(although they will do so after the fact).175  Nor should they: to release 
 
 172.  See id. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (stating that “the Corporation may take other action or 
provide assistance under this section . . . as necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects” with 
the approval of the Board of Directors, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, and the Secretary of the Treasury). 
 173.  It appears to have been used twice since 1995 in order to provide assistance to 
Citigroup and Bank of America (and their subsidiaries).  The FDIC also invoked this 
exception when approving financing for Citibank’s bid to buy Wachovia.  See Editorial, 
Who’s Too Big to Fail?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2009, at A14 (“To provide assistance, the 
[FDIC] board had to invoke the ‘systemic risk’ exception in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act”).  However, this transaction was not consummated, as Wells Fargo purchased 
Wachovia instead.  See id. (“Yet days later, Wachovia cut a better deal to sell itself to Wells 
Fargo, instead of Citi.”). 
 174.  A recent study shows that a majority of nations (56% in a sample of 142 countries) 
require judicial intervention in a bank failure.  See Matej Marin & Vasja Rant, A cross-
country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes, 13 J. FIN. STAB. 134, 140 (2014).  The authors 
find an association between the presence of an administrative model and pronounced effects 
from the crisis.  But, consistent with the observations above, they also find that a judicial 
model is associated with higher transaction costs and value depreciation.  Id. at 135 (“We 
find some support that an administrative bank bankruptcy regime is positively associated 
with the presence of the global financial crisis compared to a court-led bank bankruptcy 
regime.  On the other hand, court involvement in bank bankruptcy is associated with higher 
output loss and fiscal costs in the global financial crisis.”). 
 175.  See Sumit Agarwal, David Lucca, Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, Inconsistent 
Regulators: Evidence From Banking, 129 Q.J. ECON. 889, 889-90 (2014)  (discussing use of 
bank regulatory reports); see also Joe Adler, Bank Exam Ratings Might Not Be as Secret as 
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information about troubled banks in real time would risk inducing the very 
thing—panicked withdrawals—the system seeks to avoid. 
Courts, by contrast, depend to a much greater degree on transparency.  
In theory, pleadings filed in court are public records.  Transparency, in 
turn, facilitates participation in the bankruptcy process.  While a 
bankruptcy system could be modified to exempt retail depositors from the 
stay (in order to preserve their liquidity), the optical effect of a bank’s 
bankruptcy may damage the bank’s reputation and individual depositor’s 
confidence in it and the banking system as a whole. 
The bank resolution model also involves braiding.  Here, regulators 
are the dominant institution, working with the market (through a P&A) in a 
secondary role.  The braiding works when it enables regulators and the 
regulated to respond more quickly and efficiently to bank failure than 
market- or court-dominant choices.  As with braiding in contracts, it 
permits flexibility across more and less formal mechanisms in order to 
preserve stability in the banking system.  While it severely constricts 
stakeholder participation—neither depositors nor bank shareholders are 
likely to be consulted in the resolution process—concerns about the chaotic 
nature of participation (bank panics) would appear to make regulatory 
resolution a sensible choice for banks with retail depositors.  It avoids the 
anarchy that Hart and Sacks feared. 
As with all institutional choices, there are costs to this model.  First, 
braiding here is weak because it is unlikely there is robust market 
participation.  It is possible that regulators engage in some kind of 
competitive bidding when they find a healthy bank to take over a failed 
bank.  But the need for speed and secrecy in the process make this 
implausible.  Thus, to the extent that market resolution involves a kind of 
braiding that depends heavily on stakeholder participation, one can say that 
regulatory resolution is significantly less participatory than other forms of 
resolution.  Indeed the lack of participation may be perceived as one of the 
key benefits of regulatory resolution. 
Yet, this places great pressure on the quality of decision-making by 
regulators.  In the context of bank failure, there is no serious claim that 
bank regulators are corrupt or incompetent.  But, there is also no reason to 
believe that they are immune from the public-choice challenges that burden 
other regulators.  As in other regulatory settings, the regulated may well 
have the upper hand, whether because of the revolving door or 
informational overload or significant disparities in resource deployment.  
 
You Think, AM. BANKER (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/176_157/fdic-bank-failures-1041141-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1  
(describing market efforts to approximate regulatory bank-safety ratings through 
independent analysis due to the official confidentiality of the process).   
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Thus, the second cost of regulatory resolution will be the loss of the 
legitimacy that we otherwise associate with market or judicial resolutions. 
Third, as noted above, the unpredictability of regulatory resolution 
materially affects ex ante incentives.  Unlike market or judicial resolution, 
regulators intentionally keep the market in the dark about potential bank 
receiverships.  Some workout activity may occur at the bank holding 
company level.  Bank holding companies may be publicly-traded entities, 
which will disclose financial information.  The information needed to 
engage in a pre-resolution workout of the bank itself is, however, unlikely 
to be available to the full range of potential participants.  It will be 
available to those participants regulators choose to share the information 
with.  Of course, bank managers themselves should know that the bank is 
in trouble.  If so, they may seek market-based resolution, through 
additional capital infusions or other transactions—assuming regulators 
permit it.  But, if managers believe that a regulator will provide support, 
they might consider that preferable, depending on the terms.  
Alternatively—and as contemplated by Dodd-Frank (discussed below)—
regulators may remove managers before they have the chance to negotiate a 
resolution.  In any case, the same fear of panic that motivates regulators to 
conceal failure from the public should caution potential rescue partners for 
the troubled bank.  Those who would rescue banks should always worry 
that their efforts will be rewarded with a receivership—which may be no 
reward at all. 
To be sure, the bank regulatory model produces a kind of institutional 
settlement, in that it preserves the stability of the system.  But the process is 
intentionally and necessarily opaque, giving regulators enormous discretion 
to pick winners and losers largely free of either market or judicial checks 
and balances.  While Congress may have “duly” vested regulators with 
authority to seize failed banks, there is far less process and accountability 
in this model than in those in which markets or courts are the dominant 
institutions. 
Yet, once we expand the regulatory umbrella to reach non-bank firms, 
as Dodd-Frank will do, many of the costs and few of its benefits follow 
because the braiding dynamic inverts: the size and complexity of the 
regulated will give them leverage over the regulators, and neither markets 
nor courts will be in a position to check or balance the excesses of 
regulatory decisions so made.  This, then, is regulatory displacement:  large 
financial services firms will choose participation through regulatory 
resolution—rather than markets or courts—because it holds the promise of 
increasing their size and potential government subsidy, without the hard 
costs of renegotiation or bankruptcy. 
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IV. DODD-FRANK AND REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT 
Regulatory displacement is perhaps most prominently evidenced by 
the “orderly liquidation authority” (OLA) created by Dodd-Frank.176  A 
central goal of Dodd-Frank was to create a mechanism for the resolution of 
failed financial firms that was neither a bailout nor bankruptcy.177  Bailouts 
were politically untenable, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was 
evidence to some that (bankruptcy) courts could not be trusted to resolve 
the failure of nonbank financial firms in an orderly fashion.  The orderly 
liquidation authority created by Dodd-Frank was thus meant to be a third 
way: liquidations through FDIC receiverships. 
The key institutional problem with the OLA is that it creates 
uncertainty, which exacerbates Dodd-Frank’s regulatory complexity.  It 
will thus likely undermine an important form of participation by deterring 
or eliminating the negotiations that should precede and ameliorate the 
resolution of most financial failures.  Intentionally or not, regulators will 
displace market and judicial processes.  This will, in turn, result in more 
concentration and regulatory subsidy—exactly the opposite of what Dodd-
Frank seeks to achieve. 
A. Which Firms? 
The first uncertainty is at the threshold: which firms are potentially 
subject to an orderly liquidation process?  The decision whether to put a 
financial company into the resolution regime is made by regulators, not 
market actors (e.g., creditors or the firm itself).  If the Secretary of the 
Treasury concludes that a systemically important company is “in default or 
in danger of default,” two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board and two-
thirds of the FDIC board have recommended resolution, and he (or she) has 
 
 176.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 177.  See Federal Reserve Perspectives on Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (arguing that, following 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and AIG’s bailout, “there is little doubt that we need a third option 
between the choices of bankruptcy and bailout for those firms” in the form of a “new 
resolution regime for non-banks, analogous to the regime currently used by the FDIC for 
banks”); see also Christopher Dodd, The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 
2010, S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 4 (2010) (describing an early version of Title II as “giv[ing] 
the U.S. government a viable alternative to the undesirable choice it faced during the 
financial crisis between bankruptcy of a large, complex financial company that would 
disrupt markets and damage the economy, and bailout of such financial company that would 
expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market discipline”).  As noted above, regulators 
initially characterized the OLA as simply an expansion of the bank-failure model.  See 
discussion supra note 158. 
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also consulted with the President, the Secretary can initiate the new 
resolution process.178  The Treasury Secretary’s decision is subject to 24-
hour, confidential review by the United States District Court in the District 
of Washington, D.C.179  Dodd-Frank defines “default” loosely, at best.180  
Observers expect that judicial review is unlikely to be a significant check 
on the administrative process.181 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has already 
designated a number of firms to be systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) eligible for orderly liquidation, including thirty very 
large bank holding companies (BHCs), three non-banking financial 
services firms and eight “financial market utilities.”182  A key 
distinguishing feature of a SIFI is that it is “predominantly engaged in 
financial activities,” generally defined as 85% or more of revenue or 
assets.183 
 
 178.  12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(a)(iii). 
 179.  12 U.S.C. § 1582. 
 180.  Dodd-Frank lists factors to be considered when determining whether a systemically 
important financial firm is in “default.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 5383(c)(4) (establishing “For 
purposes of this subchapter, a financial company shall be considered to be in default or in 
danger of default if, as determined in accordance with subsection (b)—(A) a case has been, 
or likely will promptly be, commenced with respect to the financial company under the 
Bankruptcy Code; (B) the financial company has incurred, or is likely to incur, losses that 
will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable prospect for the 
company to avoid such depletion; (C) the assets of the financial company are, or are likely 
to be, less than its obligations to creditors and others; or (D) the financial company is, or is 
likely to be, unable to pay its obligations (other than those subject to a bona fide dispute) in 
the normal course of business.”).  For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this Article, 
Dodd-Frank’s use of the term “default” could easily be manipulated to find (or avoid 
finding) a firm was in “default.” 
 181.  See Kenneth E. Scott, A Guide to the Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: 
Dodd-Frank Title II and Proposed Chapter 14 12 n.31 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin 
Working Paper No. 426, 2012) (arguing “A creditor can file suit to have a court determine 
the validity or amount of a claim against the failed institution (§210(a)(4)), but judicial 
review of FDIC’s decisions on claim transfers is prohibited. §210(a)(9)(D)(ii).”); see also 
Thomas H. Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation 
Authority and a New Chapter 14 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet-4-11.pdf 
(arguing that Bankruptcy Code should be amended to resolve failures of large financial 
firms).  
 182.  See Financial Stability Oversight Council:  Financial Market Utility Designations, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank (last updated Apr. 2, 2015, 2:13 
PM). 
 183.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(4)(B) (defining U.S. nonbank financial company); see 
also  12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6) (defining “predominantly engaged in financial activities”). 
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This presumably takes Google off the table—but what about Apple, if 
its new “Apple Pay” feature becomes a major portion of its revenue?184  
Conversely, what if fear of an OLA proceeding leads a financial firm’s 
counterparties to flee, such that revenues fall below the 85% threshold?  
What about types of firms that might well be financial in nature, but claim 
not to be “systemically important,” such as very large hedge funds?185  
Neither Dodd-Frank nor its thousands of pages of implementing regulations 
fully answer these questions. 
B. What Effect? 
If a firm is subject to the OLA, it would be treated as a receivership 
run by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), akin to a bank 
resolution discussed in the Introduction.186  Managers of the firm would 
presumably be fired, and the assets and liabilities of the firm transferred to 
a third party187 or to a temporary “bridge” company to hold until some sort 
of orderly liquidation or sale was possible.188  As noted above, a common 
strategy in bank failures is the so-called “purchase and assumption,” 
whereby a healthy bank purchases the assets and assumes the liabilities (in 
particular, deposits) of the failed bank.189  The FDIC may mimic this 
strategy under OLA. 
The effect of an OLA proceeding is uncertain in at least two respects.  
First, a true liquidation would destroy significant value, so there is little 
reason to believe that the FDIC would in all cases seek to sell off the failed 
firm’s assets.190  Indeed, because a failed financial firm’s main assets are 
likely to be contracts with other financial firms, a true liquidation could 
rapidly deflate their value, thus impairing counterparties and creating 
knock-on effects Dodd-Frank seeks to avoid.  The orderly liquidation 
authority therefore cannot mean what it says: it will not really produce a 
 
 184.  See [Apple] Pay, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay/?cid=wwa-us-kwg-
features-com (last visited Apr. 24, 2015) (showing the features of Apple’s new payment 
system for customers). 
 185.  See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, REPORT ON ASSET MANAGEMENT AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/ 
Documents/OFR_AMFS_FINAL.pdf (“[T]he activities and risks posed by hedge funds, 
private equity, and other private funds are not addressed in detail”). 
 186.  Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010); 12 U.S.C. § 
5384(b) (2006).  See also discussion supra Part III.C.  
 187.  12 U.S.C. § 210(a)(1)(G) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4) (2006). 
 188.  12 U.S.C. § 210(h) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1) (2006). 
 189.  See Hynes & Walt, supra note 164, at 1002-03 (discussing the “purchase and 
assumption” strategy used by healthy banks). 
 190.  See SKEEL, NEW DEAL, supra note 23, at 150 (arguing Dodd-Frank liquidations 
“increase[] the potential for value to be squandered”). 
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liquidation, but instead some sort of covert reorganization, along the lines 
of a purchase and assumption transaction the FDIC has used when banks 
fail.  Whether or to what extent the resolution is a true liquidation or a 
purchase and assumption is, however, unclear. 
This suggests a second uncertainty about effect: How will the 
purchasers (winners?) be chosen?  Market and judicial (bankruptcy) 
regimes typically use negotiated or competitive bidding.  While the 
bankruptcy process is replete with imperfections—indeed, so is the market, 
which is one reason we have bankruptcy—they are minor when compared 
to the error costs likely to flow from poor regulatory decision-making in 
the heat of a crisis.  Because crises happen quickly, and regulators are 
subject to little judicial review, significant errors seem inevitable. 
This is not to say that regulators would necessarily choose “friends” 
over “enemies” (although they might).  Instead, it means that they are 
likely to respond exactly as they did in 2008-2009: They will seek 
ostensibly healthy institutions—JPMorgan Chase, in the recent crisis—to 
take over and absorb the weaker institution.  While Dodd-Frank imposes 
some limits on regulators’ ability to sweeten the deal for the acquirer, the 
net effect will be the same: greater concentration.  This, however, was 
something Dodd-Frank was meant to reduce. 
C. Which Entity?—Single Point of Entry 
Given the structural complexity of large financial firms, a key 
question for regulators under Dodd-Frank was how to pick the right entities 
in a large firm to put into receivership—some or all?  Either choice—
known as “multiple point of entry”—would present significant challenges 
for regulators, because they would have to make difficult, fairly granular 
decisions in very short order, with limited information about the impact of 
these decisions on contractual counterparties as well as entities in the group 
not placed in receivership.191  Given the complexity of the firms in 
question, regulators would face great difficulty making good choices. 
To solve this problem, the FDIC has proposed “single point of entry” 
(SPOE).  Under SPOE, the FDIC would not need to decide ex ante which 
of a firm’s hundreds or thousands of subsidiaries or affiliates to liquidate: it 
would only look at the top-tier (parent) entity, and seize that one.192  That 
entity would be placed in receivership, its assets (subsidiaries) remaining 
technically outside the process.  A “bridge” financial company would 
continue to perform the same functions as the holding company of the 
 
 191.  SPOE Proposal, supra note 26, at 76,615. 
 192.  Id. at 76,616.  
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covered financial company, which would then convert to a “NewCo” 
successor to the failed firm.193  Independent experts would perform a 
valuation of the bridge financial company, and upon the FDIC’s approval 
of the value, payments of claims in the receivership would be made through 
issuance of securities in a securities-for-claims exchange.194  In theory, the 
exchange would avoid liquidating the bridge financial company’s assets 
while providing value to its creditors by issuing to the receiver new debt 
and equity in NewCo, which the receiver would exchange for the creditors’ 
claims.195  In essence, equity holders of the parent would likely be 
eliminated, and debt-holders of the corporate parent would become its new 
shareholders. 
The FDIC believes that the SPOE resolution strategy would minimize 
disruption and instability because the subsidiaries will continue to perform 
critical operations for the financial system, instead of causing disruption by 
closing.196  The FDIC also claims that the SPOE strategy would reduce the 
risk of spillover effects to counterparties because the subsidiaries would 
remain in operation and the bridge financial company would assume any 
obligations supporting subsidiaries’ contracts.197  Thus, the FDIC has said 
that “counterparties to most of the financial company’s derivative contracts 
would have no legal right to terminate and net out their contracts.  Such 
action would prevent a disorderly termination of these contracts and a 
resulting fire sale of assets.”198 
Although SPOE creates the appearance of a simplifying regime, it 
would in fact appear to defer rather than solve the informational problems 
created by the need to prevent or resolve the failure of large financial firms 
deeply interconnected with one another and their regulators.  
Commentators have focused on three problems with SPOE. 
First, David Skeel has observed that SPOE does little to solve 
problems of uncertainty under the FDIC’s orderly liquidation authority, 
because it does not impose a time requirement for the FDIC to act or take 
other measures to mitigate this problem.199  The chance that regulators will 
either jump the gun or delay interfering increases if a major subsidiary 
suffers severe financial distress and capital and liquidity are not sufficient 
to resolve it, as SPOE does not give regulators additional means to provide 
 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 76,618.   
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 76,616. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  David A. Skeel, Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS 
THE GREAT DIVIDE:  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 323-24 (Martin Neil Baily 
& John B. Taylor eds., 2014).  
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support to the subsidiary.200  Even if the government attempts to interfere in 
such a situation, the resolution may fail or the SIFI could be under the 
regulators’ authority for much longer than planned under the SPOE 
strategy.201 
Second, Stephen Lubben has noted that focusing on the holding 
company may be unhelpful, because it is unlikely to be the cause of the 
SIFI’s financial distress, or have the proper location in the capital structure 
to provide a basis for effective resolution.202  For example, with respect to 
the proposal to recapitalize operating subsidiaries by forgiving 
intercompany debt owed to the parent company, it “seems unreasonable” 
that managers and regulators would be able to ensure that there is enough 
intercompany debt at the struggling subsidiary when cosigning the debt.203  
Therefore, the FDIC must consider additional sources of recapitalization 
for the subsidiary, such as “the creation of a new, post-OLA intercompany 
debt funded by the parent’s own borrowing.”204  Furthermore, because the 
FDIC has not clarified how it will value the holding company’s assets, this 
lending could become a “disguised bailout” because a loan to an insolvent 
subsidiary could only be secured by the value of the SIFI’s other 
subsidiaries, which may not be sufficient to support the liquidity needs of 
the insolvent subsidiary.205  Nor has the FDIC explained how it will resolve 
a SIFI that has multiple struggling subsidiaries.206 
Third, others worry that SPOE may not be the only strategy used.207  
This may cause creditors, counterparties, and foreign regulators to resist 
reliance on an SPOE because they worry that the FDIC will instead (or in 
addition) use its Title II resolution authority to resolve a global financial 
services firm in other ways that harm their interests.  If this occurs, 
“creditors and counterparties with the legal right and practical ability to run 
 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Stephen J. Lubben, Thoughts on Single Point of Entry (Seton Hall Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 2392450, 2014).   
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. at 2. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  See id. (discussing how in such a situation, the FDIC may have used SPOE as an 
ideal approach but realistically would have to use a strategy more similar to a multiple point 
of entry approach because “in many cases it seems likely that the FDIC might have to 
conduct receivership proceedings with respect to an offending subsidiary, in addition to the 
holding company, and that in many such cases it might not be possible to do anything but 
liquidate that subsidiary to avoid complete devastation of the remaining group”). 
 207.  Letter from Bipartisan Policy Center, to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 7 (Mar. 6, 2014), [hereinafter “BPC Comment Letter”] 
available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20SPOE%20Comment%20 
Letter.pdf; Lubben, supra note 202, at 4. 
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may run, and foreign regulators may ring-fence local assets rather than rely 
on and cooperate with the FDIC.”208  Therefore, SPOE could aggravate 
financial instability if counterparties and the public are not confident that 
the FDIC is fully committed to implementing it.209 
In addition to these regulatory uncertainties, consider some more 
prosaic doctrinal problems single point of entry might raise: 
Entity Integrity.  The law presumes that separate corporate 
subsidiaries are separate legal persons for most purposes.210  While the 
corporate parent in a SIFI may have direct or indirect control of 
subsidiaries or affiliates, it would do so only through ordinary governance 
or contractual mechanisms.  If the FDIC wishes to exert greater control 
over these subsidiaries, will it respect these mechanisms, and the 
independence of the subsidiaries (especially special purpose entities created 
in securitizations or similar transactions)?  Or will it attempt a kind of 
“substantive consolidation,” as sometimes occurs in Chapter 11 cases 
involving large corporate groups?  If so, on what legal authority would it 
do so?211 
Intercompany Claims.  Similarly, how would SPOE treat 
intercompany claims?  In theory, the corporate parent’s creditors and 
shareholders are “structurally subordinate” to the creditors of subsidiary 
entities.212  If, however, the parent (controlled by an FDIC receiver or 
bridge company) seeks to withdraw (e.g., through dividend) assets of the 
subsidiaries, what becomes of the subsidiaries’ creditors or other 
stakeholders?  What about horizontal netting or set-off among affiliates? 
Termination of Qualified Financial Contracts.  Many subsidiaries of a 
SIFI parent will be parties to swaps, repurchase agreements, and other so-
called “qualified financial contracts” (QFCs).213  If a bank fails, the FDIC 
has special powers as receiver to preserve these contracts for about one 
business day.214  While Dodd-Frank would extend this power to entities 
 
 208.  BPC Comment Letter, supra note 207, at 7. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the presumption 
that corporate subsidiaries are separate legal persons for the most part).  
 211.  See, e.g., Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo 
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing the fact that in substantive 
consolidation, the independent identities of affiliates will be disregarded in bankruptcy).   
 212.  See Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (addressing the theory that 
corporate parent’s creditors and shareholders are structurally subordinate to the creditors of 
subsidiary entities).  
 213.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D) (stating that the term “qualified financial contract” 
is defined broadly in connection with the FDIC’s receivership powers to include swap, 
derivative and similar contracts likely to be a significant part of a large financial firm’s 
portfolio).   
 214.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(10)(B)(i)(I) (stating “A person who is a party to a 
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actually in a receivership, it is not clear how the FDIC could prevent 
termination of QFCs to which subsidiaries are parties where the 
subsidiaries themselves are not in a receivership.215  While QFC contracts 
could be modified to stay termination upon the parent’s liquidation, they 
could also contain “ipso facto” clauses that permit termination in such 
event.216 
To be sure, single point of entry is not the law yet.  The FDIC 
proposed the strategy in 2013 and has been receiving comments since then.  
At this point, it seems likely to be the preference of both the FDIC and 
large financial firms.217  Institutional analysis would predict that, because it 
appears to be the participatory choice of both regulators and the regulated, 
SPOE is likely to become the resolution mechanism of choice. 
D. Which Institution? 
A final, perhaps essential, class of uncertainty under Dodd-Frank is 
which regime—and therefore which institution—will resolve the distress: 
bankruptcy or receivership?  As written by Congress, Dodd-Frank’s orderly 
liquidation authority proposed a process akin to a bank receivership that 
would promote the orderly resolution of the distress of large financial 
firms.218  More recently, however, it appears that regulators want to 
 
qualified financial contract with an insured depository institution may not exercise any right 
that such person has to terminate, liquidate, or net such contract . . . until 5:00 p.m. (eastern 
time) on the business day following the date of the appointment of the receiver . . . .”). 
 215.  See FEDERAL FINANCIAL ANALYTICS, INC., WHAT IT TAKES TO MAKE THE FDIC 
RESOLUTION PROPOSAL WORK 5 (2014) [hereinafter “FedFin”], available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/2013-single-point-entry-c_10.pdf 
(arguing that SPOE “may not address QFCs, especially those with cross-default clauses, in a 
definitive fashion or in a manner that quashes TBTF expectations”). 
 216.  See id. at 4 (pointing out that “the FDIC and several global regulators have 
petitioned QFC counterparties to revise contractual standards to provide for an automatic 
stay when a resolution authority seizes a financial institution, giving the resolver time to 
assess resources and structure an orderly payment process that blocks the race to the exit 
generally called fire-sale risk.”).  It is not clear whether such contractual modifications will 
be made or would remain in effect in the run up to the collapse of a SIFI.  
 217.  See id. (discussing the reality that single point of entry is the preference of the 
FDIC and large financial firms). 
 218.  See, e.g., Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to Fail” 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 51-52 (2009) 
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.) (describing bankruptcy as a 
“very messy process for financial organizations” due in part to the Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic stay on most creditor claims except for financial contracts, and calling for an 
alternative resolution authority “similar to that which exists for FDIC insured banks”).  The 
FDIC has claimed that, had Lehman Brothers been liquidated under the OLA rather than 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured creditors would have received 97 cents 
on the dollar, rather than an estimated 21 cents on the dollar.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 
ARTICLE 1 (LIPSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:35 AM 
722 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
encourage such firms to use Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code if possible, 
in particular through the development of so-called “living wills” that would 
spell out in advance how a bankruptcy would work for the firm.219 
Among other things, a living will requires a covered financial firm to 
develop a plan for “rapid and orderly resolution,” which is defined as “a 
reorganization or liquidation of the [firm] . . . under the Bankruptcy Code 
that can be accomplished within a reasonable period of time and in a 
manner that substantially mitigates the risk that the failure of the [firm] 
would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United 
States.”220  Although firms can be penalized for failing to develop adequate 
living wills,221 the living wills apparently have no binding force in any 
subsequent resolution procedure, under the Bankruptcy Code or 
otherwise.222  Nor can they be used in any “private cause of action” that 
may follow the firm’s failure.223  Even regulators currently appear skeptical 
of their value.224 
While living wills create a number of uncertainties—What is their 
legal effect?  Who can see them?  Who is responsible for defects in 
 
The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
FDIC Q., 2011, at 4-5, available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_ 
vol5_2/lehman.pdf (suggesting that the FDIC prefers receivership over bankruptcy).  
 219.  See 76 Fed. Reg. 211 (Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter “Living Will Rule”] (outlining the 
final rules implementing the so-called “living will” requirements). 
 220.  Id.  
 221.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(5)(A) (stating that “If a nonbank financial company 
supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection 
(a) fails to timely resubmit the resolution plan as required under paragraph (4), with such 
revisions as are required under subparagraph (B), the Board of Governors and the 
Corporation may jointly impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, 
or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidiary 
thereof, until such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies the deficiencies.”). 
 222.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(6) (stating that “A resolution plan submitted in accordance 
with this subsection shall not be binding on a bankruptcy court, a receiver appointed under 
subchapter II, or any other authority that is authorized or required to resolve the nonbank 
financial company supervised by the Board, any bank holding company, or any subsidiary 
or affiliate of the foregoing.”). 
 223.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(7) (stating that “No private right of action may be based 
on any resolution plan submitted in accordance with this subsection.”).  Needless to say, the 
meanings of “private right of action” and “based on” are unclear.  If the board of directors 
was grossly negligent in developing a living will, would a suit against them by a Chapter 11 
trustee on behalf of the estate of the debtor be barred under this provision?  One of many 
litigation questions to be considered in the future. 
 224. See Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice-Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, Statement on the 
Credibility of Living Wills (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/events/business_law/2014/11/banking/living-wills-201411.authcheckdam.pdf 
(observing that  “Despite the thousands of pages of material these firms submitted, the 
[living will] plans provide no credible or clear path through bankruptcy that doesn’t require 
unrealistic assumptions and direct or indirect public support.”).  
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them?—the basic problem is the institutional ambivalence they signal.  If 
Congress wants regulators under Title II of Dodd-Frank to oversee orderly 
liquidations, why encourage planning under the Bankruptcy Code?  These 
are fundamentally different institutional choices, with different 
implications for the processes and outcomes likely to ensue.  This is 
especially troubling because we have no idea whether, or to what extent, a 
living will would play any role at all, in whatever institutional choice was 
ultimately made about the distress of the firm.  If regulators give mixed 
signals about which institution should govern the failure of large financial 
firms, how can we expect market actors to engage in the planning and 
negotiation that would ordinarily be preferable when financial distress 
occurs? 
E. Regulatory Displacement of Market-Based Renegotiation 
From an institutional perspective, these uncertainties impede 
participation when it should matter most: when the large financial firm’s 
management has recognized a serious problem, and should seek to 
renegotiate the contracts creating the distress.  To do so would have the 
virtues of aligning participation with incentives: those with the most at 
stake in the firm’s failure will likely attempt to renegotiate a solution in the 
shadow of bankruptcy.  If renegotiation fails, the debtor may either 
commence (or be forced into) a bankruptcy or hand the company over to 
creditors.  While this may be somewhat costly and messy, it avoids the 
(presumptively greater) cost and stigma of bailouts and moral hazard 
otherwise associated with regulatory resolution.  More importantly, it has 
the potential to contain losses at the troubled firm and its counterparts, who 
will presumably agree only to those losses they reasonably believe they can 
absorb. 
Dodd-Frank is not insensible to the possibility of market-based 
renegotiations.  Section 165(i) of Dodd-Frank requires large bank holding 
companies and certain other financial services firms to undergo “stress 
tests.”225  Certain aspects of the results are made public.  Similarly, living 
wills might give market participants information they need to work out a 
troubled financial firm’s distress.  But the legal force and effect of stress 
 
 225.  See Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1)(A) (stating that “The Board of 
Governors, in coordination with the appropriate primary financial regulatory agencies and 
the Federal Insurance Office, shall conduct annual analyses in which nonbank financial 
companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in 
subsection (a) are subject to evaluation of whether such companies have the capital, on a 
total consolidated basis, necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic 
conditions.”). 
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tests and living wills is unclear.  Nor is there any clear connection between 
which firms must undergo stress tests, create living wills, or be the subject 
of a potential OLA proceeding.  A single firm could be the subject of all 
three—or not, as regulators may choose.  The many layers of uncertainty 
created by Dodd-Frank’s resolution (and related) regimes compound the 
complexity created by this enormous expansion of regulatory power. 
Moreover, the participatory justifications for the FDIC’s resolution 
authority are weaker here than would be the case in traditional bank 
failures.  Non-bank firms that are likely candidates for orderly resolution 
are not like banks in a key participatory way: they are unlikely to have 
retail depositors, for whom regulators proxy.  After all, the bank-holding 
company (corporate parent) in an SPOE likely has only interests in 
subsidiaries, which may include regulated depositaries as well as many 
other types of financial firms.  But the distress of the target of the current 
regulatory resolution strategy—the parent entity—is unlikely to experience 
the kind of shifted distribution that legitimates the bank failure regime.  
Bank holding companies can and do engage in workouts and if those fail, 
they seek Chapter 11 protection.226 Thus, bank holding companies have 
long been eligible for bankruptcy, even as the banks they own are not.227 
Instead, the most important stakeholders in the parent of a SIFI are 
likely to be other financial firms run by highly sophisticated, well-
resourced professionals, or the government itself (e.g., if it is purchasing 
securities under a “quantitative easing” program).  In the first instance, 
these counterparties are, or should be, capable of the monitoring and 
renegotiation generally found in non-bank distress renegotiations.  While 
stress tests and living wills are laudable, they seem unlikely to overcome 
the uncertainty and complexity of Dodd-Frank’s resolution regime, and the 
incentive effects it will have on potential pre-failure negotiations. 
Which means that, if (when) distress hits a very large financial firm, 
we could end up roughly where we were in March 2008, after the Bear 
Stearns bailout: managers of large financial firms were increasingly 
worried about their counterparties’ viability, but were uncertain what to do 
about it.  While market-oriented resolution may be preferable on normative 
and efficiency grounds, the complexity and uncertainty of Dodd-Frank 
make this much less likely.  Rather, it would seem more sensible for 
managers of these firms to seek regulatory help—exactly as they did in 
2008-2009.  While regulators ostensibly cannot provide the sort of direct 
financial assistance associated with the crisis, they—in particular the 
Federal Reserve—retain many powers to subsidize market actors in order 
 
 226.  Supra note 10. 
 227.  Id. 
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to provide stability, including through the “broad-based” repurchase of 
troubled securities, such as mortgage-backed securities in the most recent 
crisis.228  But that simply means that—as many fear—bailouts will remain a 
feature of the system. 
This is not to suggest that regulators should have no role in preventing 
or resolving the financial distress of large financial firms.  Perhaps the most 
useful function they could serve would be to facilitate renegotiations 
among distressed financial firms, as happened with Long-Term Capital 
Management in the 1990s.229  Nothing prevents them from doing this.  But, 
if managers of large financial firms understand that the complexities and 
uncertainties of Dodd-Frank compound the transactional and structural 
complexity of their firms, they will in times of trouble be hard pressed to 
do anything but seek government assistance.  They will remain stuck in the 
“doom loop” described in Part I because it is in their collective and 
respective interests to do so. 
V. AGAINST REGULATORY DISPLACEMENT—JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 
If regulatory displacement is likely to maintain Haldane’s doom loop, 
how do we get out of it?  Given the political economy of financial 
regulation, it is unlikely that Congress or regulators will address the 
underlying pathologies of concentration, complexity, and capture.  Nor do 
markets alone have the incentive to do so.  Regulators and large firms 
appear to braid with one another, notwithstanding the economic and 
normative costs associated with this trend.  This leaves the judiciary to 
produce what Hart and Sacks call “institutional settlement,” aided perhaps 
by market forces.230  This part discusses two strategies to reassert the 
institutional authority of the judiciary to prevent or resolve financial 
distress, the proposed “Chapter 14” amendment to the Bankruptcy Code 
and a novel approach to fiduciary review of directors’ duty of oversight. 
 
 228.  12 U.S.C. § 222-223 (2010); see also Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in 
Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 267 (2010) (arguing that “the amended statute, with its requirement that 
the Fed establish schemes of ‘broad-based eligibility,’ may even contemplate such asset 
purchases—so long as they occur on a wide scale.”). 
 229.  See FCIC REPORT, supra note 19, at 57 (discussing resolution of failed hedge fund 
brokered by New York Fed, which “involved no government funds”). 
 230.  See LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 4, at 4. 
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A. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14 
Many recognize that courts should play a larger role in preventing and 
resolving financial distress, and so look to the judicial process that has 
traditionally addressed failure: bankruptcy.  Perhaps the most ambitious 
effort comes from Stanford’s Hoover Institute, which has proposed an 
entirely new chapter to the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 14, which would be 
available exclusively to the same systemically important financial firms 
that title II of Dodd-Frank purports to regulate, but would use a different 
institution—courts.231  Bowing to the political reality that Dodd-Frank is a 
law whose repeal is unlikely, however, it is offered “either in addition to or 
as an alternative to” Dodd-Frank.232 
The main contribution of Chapter 14 can be understood in institutional 
terms: it would dilute regulatory authority by making a judicial 
alternative—bankruptcy—more palatable.233  The goal of Chapter 14 is, 
according to its proponents, “to ensure that the covered financial 
institutions, creditors dealing with them, and other market participants, 
know in advance, in a clear and predictable way, how losses will be 
allocated if the institution fails.”234  The theoretical justification is familiar: 
the possibility of bailouts distorts incentives.  Jackson writes that “[i]f the 
creditors of a failed financial institution are protected (bailed out), then the 
strongest and most rapidly responding constraint on risk-taking by the 
financial institution’s management is destroyed, and their losses are 
transferred to others.”235 
The functional heart of the proposal would limit derivatives 
counterparties from closing out their positions upon bankruptcy, as 
happened in Lehman Brothers with problematic consequences.236  The 
 
 231.  As Thomas Jackson, the principal author of the proposal and one of the nation’s 
leading experts on bankruptcy explains, the Chapter 14 proposal is designed “especially for 
the complexity and potential systemic consequences, of the failure of [a] large financial 
institution[].”  Thomas Jackson, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal 2 (Feb. 28, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Bankruptcy 
-Code-Chapter-14-Proposal-20120228.pdf. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at 2 (noting that “we believe it is possible to take advantage of a judicial 
proceeding . . . in such a way as to minimize the felt necessity to use the alternative 
government agency resolution process recently enacted as a part of [Dodd-Frank].”). 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id.  
 236.  See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011) (discussing the disruptive effects of derivative 
counterparties who have the right to jump ahead of even secured creditors for repayment);  
see also Thomas Jackson & David Skeel, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in 
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152 (2012) (discussing the importance of transaction 
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Bankruptcy Code creates a series of “safe harbors” under which parties to 
certain kinds of derivatives are not stayed by bankruptcy from enforcing 
their rights.237  Originally meant to promote market stability, they have 
apparently permitted the kinds of “runs” that bankruptcy was meant to 
prevent, acting as a financial crisis “accelerator,” in Mark Roe’s words.238  
The “single most important ‘fix’” in the Chapter 14 proposal would give 
financial firm debtors in Chapter 14 three days to decide whether to 
perform these contracts, or let the counterparties terminate them (which 
they can currently do immediately).239  There is much to be said for this 
element of the Chapter 14 proposal. 
The problem is that the case to amend the Bankruptcy Code to create a 
whole new chapter has not yet been made, and especially not as evidenced 
by the Chapter 14 proposal.  First, the proposals on derivative contracts 
should apply not only to large financial firms under Chapter 14, but to all 
firms in bankruptcy.  Those safe harbors have become problematic for a 
wide range of firms, not simply systemically important financial 
institutions.240  While large financial firms may be more likely to be parties 
to these contracts, many other debtors are, as well, and they are often 
equally problematic. 
Second, the Chapter 14 proposal’s political pragmatism undermines its 
goal of creating institutional predictability.  The authors sensibly recognize 
that Dodd-Frank is not likely to be repealed.  So, they cagily suggest that 
Chapter 14 could comfortably co-exist with Dodd-Frank.  But if we do not 
know when or to whom Dodd-Frank is to apply, why would a dual judicial 
track create greater certainty?  Just as more recent efforts to promote 
Chapter 11 planning under “living wills” create institutional uncertainty, it 
would not. 
 
consistency by removing derivatives’ exemptions from a number of bankruptcy’s core 
provisions). 
 237.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), 559, 560 (codifying the exemptions from the 
automatic stay and contractual rights in relation to repurchase or swap agreements). 
 238.  See Roe, supra note 236 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code’s favored treatment 
of firms’ derivative and financial repurchase contracts facilitated the firms’ failures and 
undermined market discipline); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, The Loophole that Became a 
Wormhole: Why the Fed Had to Bail out AIG, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 19, 2008), 
available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/09/the_loophole_th.html 
(explaining that the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code provided a large loophole for 
special treatment in bankruptcy for credit default swap holders such as AIG). 
 239.  Jackson, supra note 231, at 36. 
 240.  See Roe, supra note 236, at 549 (“It is no surprise that sophisticated finance players 
seek to structure their transactions as derivatives or repo agreements, because it protects 
them. By doing so, the superprioritized counterparties have fewer incentives to ration their 
dealings with financially weak debtors.”). 
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Third, the proposal recognizes that bankruptcy courts currently have 
uncertain authority.  This is due to a series of Supreme Court decisions 
holding that bankruptcy judges, as Article I actors, lack authority under 
Article III of the Constitution to enter final judgments on claims “that 
constitute ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the 
courts at Westminster in 1789.’”241  While it is far from clear what this 
means in practice, the Chapter 14 proposal would avoid the problem by 
taking these resolutions away from bankruptcy judges, too.  Instead, such 
cases would be “‘funnel[ed]’” to “a limited set of pre-picked Article III 
district judges.”242 
The Chapter 14 proponents may be correct that placing these decisions 
with U.S. District Judges avoids possible constitutional challenges over 
bankruptcy judges’ authority.  But this is not their rationale.  Rather, they 
argue, somewhat surprisingly, that “it is unlikely that the nation’s several 
hundred bankruptcy judges—all of whom can be presumed to have 
important knowledge of the Bankruptcy Code itself—will have the 
requisite financial expertise to deal, in real time, with the nation’s largest 
financial institutions.”243  They also question the independence of 
bankruptcy judges who, as Article I actors, may be susceptible to political 
influence (e.g., from the Congress that sets their pay).  Jackson states: 
 
[T]he essential need for complete independence from any 
perception of influence by the financial institution, the 
government, or a particularly significant creditor, suggests that 
any bankruptcy system designed for the nation’s largest financial 
institutions would want those institutions to have their cases and 
ancillary proceedings heard before an Article III judge . . . [the] 
‘gold-plated’ standard of independence from government.244 
 
This is troubling, because it trades the appearance of independence 
against the expertise of experienced bankruptcy judges.  There is no doubt 
that a truly independent Article III judicial check on the resolution of a 
large financial firm’s failure would promote the appearance of legitimacy.  
The problem is that the Chapter 14 proposal and Dodd-Frank both choose 
the Article III District of Columbia District Court – a court that may not be 
as independent as one would hope, as appointments to that bench are 
 
 241.  See also Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article 
I Judicial Power, Fraudulent Transfers and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 
1175 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011)). 
 242.  Jackson, supra note 231, at 9. 
 243.  Id. at 8. 
 244.  Id. at 9. 
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notoriously politically fraught.245  Indeed, a large body of empirical 
literature has shown that Article III judges are often as likely to vote their 
ideology as to follow precedent.246 
At the same time, it is hard to imagine judges with greater expertise in 
dealing with the failures of large financial institutions than the bankruptcy 
(Article I) judges who oversaw the mega-cases of the crisis, including 
Robert Drain, who presided in Refco, Mary Walrath, who presided in the 
case of WaMu’s parent holding company, or James Peck, who oversaw the 
Lehman Brothers case.  There may be pragmatic arguments for taking this 
work away from them—or more plausibly providing for dual bankruptcy-
district judge appointments—but it is inappropriate to question their 
expertise or independence in this sense.  While there will always be 
concerns about political taint in any process for resolving the failure of a 
large financial firm, there will not be a second chance to capitalize on 
expertise and experience.  There are simply no other judges who have the 
experience of these and similarly situated bankruptcy judges. 
Finally, any effort to amend the Bankruptcy Code is, itself, likely to be 
politically volatile.  The last major amendment to that statute occurred in 
2005, in a highly politicized process that produced amendments considered 
to be harmful to all but the large financial institutions that aligned to 
support them.247  Given the political cycle that characterizes financial 
regulation described in Part I—special interests dominate except (perhaps) 
in a crisis—it is not clear why financial services firms would permit 
Chapter 14 to become law in any way that does not advance their interests.  
If so, then it would not likely reduce problems of concentration or 
complexity. 
I am sympathetic to the intuition behind the Chapter 14 proposal.  
There is good reason to believe that the bankruptcy process brings with it 
participatory virtues lacking in Dodd-Frank.  As a general proposition, it 
 
 245.  See Scott C. Shine, Losing streak in D.C. Circuit impacts SEC rule-making, 
LEXOLOGY, Nov. 21, 2011, at 14, available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? 
g=0032687e-e8e0-490e-8a9a-4f6f33da0705 (discussing the shift in SEC rule-making due to 
the D.C. Circuit striking down rules based on the SEC’s failure to adequately consider 
effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation as required by law).  
 246.   See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: 
Who, When and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1484, 1536 (2007) (illustrating the 
preference change and doctrinal development and shift of the Roberts court). 
 247.  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 
U.S.C.).  See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt & Democracy:  Towards a Constitutional 
Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 688-89 (2008) (discussing political 
history of BAPCPA); see generally William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile 
Lender Provision of BAPCPA, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 143 (discussing history of lobbying for 
BAPCPA). 
ARTICLE 1 (LIPSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:35 AM 
730 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
can force parties into a single forum where renegotiation under threats of 
various (worse) alternatives (e.g., liquidation or cramdown) can often 
produce better outcomes than those the market or regulators could deliver 
on their own. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why we need a whole new chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code to do this.  As discussed in Part III, there is already a 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  With some of the adjustments 
discussed in the Chapter 14 proposal—in particular re-thinking the 
derivatives safe-harbors—Chapter 11 could work for SIFIs.  Without 
clarifying limits on regulatory OLA authority, adding Chapter 14 as 
proposed only makes for greater complexity and uncertainty, significant 
factors contributing to regulatory displacement.  In short, while I support an 
expanded role for the judiciary in preventing financial crises, I am not sure 
the case has yet been made for a new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
B. Rethinking the Duty to Be Informed 
A potentially more effective, albeit imperfect, way to reduce scale and 
complexity in large financial services firms might be to look at those closer 
to the problem, and their incentives for managing certain aspects of these 
phenomena: corporate directors.  Corporate law has long recognized that 
directors have duties of care and loyalty,248 as well as a “duty to be 
informed” (DTBI), although the scope and force of that duty are 
disputed.249 Discussions of the DTBI usually begin with Caremark, a 
controversial opinion that said—but did not hold—that directors’ 
“sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise oversight” may be evidence 
of a “lack of good faith.”250 In the wake of the financial crisis, angry 
shareholders recalled this language, and sued directors of financial services 
firms alleging that directors had failed to satisfy their oversight duties.  
With one exception, the cases have provided little relief to the 
shareholders.251 
 
 248.  See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating that the rule requires 
corporate officers and directors to have an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation). 
 249.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 1996).  Of 
course, everything about the duty to be informed in Caremark may have been dicta, since 
the opinion merely approved the settlement of a shareholder lawsuit stemming from a 
board’s failure to detect and stop fraud by corporate managers.  Id. at 972. 
 250.  Id. at 971-72. 
 251.  In all but the Countrywide case, shareholders’ complaints were dismissed at the 
pleadings stages.  Compare In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Derivative Litig., No. 12 Civ. 
03878(GBD), 2014 WL 1297824, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint); Staehr v. Mack, No. 07 Civ. 
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Consider, for example, the Goldman Sachs Shareholders litigation.252  
Here, shareholders sued officers and directors of Goldman Sachs for 
breaching their duty of oversight by approving excessive compensation for 
employees, which allegedly “led to overly-risky business decisions and 
unethical and illegal practices.”253  Goldman Sachs had experienced 
substantial growth since it went public in 1999, and plaintiffs argued that 
its management “achieved this growth ‘through extreme leverage and 
significant uncontrolled exposure to risky loans and credit risks’” and that 
this business growth strategy was not in the shareholders’ best interest.254  
During 2008, Goldman Sachs suffered losses of billions of dollars, and 
plaintiffs alleged that “but for a cash infusion from Warren Buffet, federal 
government intervention and Goldman’s conversion into a bank holding 
company, Goldman would have gone into bankruptcy.”255 
In dismissing the case, the Delaware Chancery Court observed that:  
 
[t]o face a substantial likelihood of oversight liability for a 
Caremark claim, the Director Defendants must have ‘(a) . . . 
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system 
or controls’ (which the Plaintiffs concede is not the case here); 
‘or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
 
10368(DAB), 2011 WL 1330856, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss because a demand on the board was not futile); In re American Int’l 
Group, Inc. Derivative Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424 (S.D. N.Y. 2010); Louisiana Mun. 
Police Employees Ret. Sys. v. Blankfein, 08 CIV. 7605, 2009 WL 1422868, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 19, 2009); Louisiana Mun. Police Employees Ret. Sys. v. Pandit, 08 CIV. 
7389LTSRLE, 2009 WL 2902587 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. 
S’holder Litig., CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) with 
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(allowing plaintiffs to proceed because the shareholders’ allegations raised a strong 
inference of scienter, and the demand requirement was excused). 
   Regulators have tried to improve disclosure regarding risk management practices, 
although it is not clear whether these changes would have any impact on discharging duties 
of oversight. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9089, 34-
61175, IC-29092, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 29, 2009) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 
240, 249, 274); see also N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 
303A.07(b)(i)(D) (2009) (mandating that listed companies have an audit committee charged 
with, among other things, “discuss[ing] policies with respect to risk assessment and risk 
management”). 
 252.  Goldman Sachs, 2011 WL 4826104 at *2.  Although the Citigroup case was the 
first major case in the DTBI context connected to the financial crisis, its progeny (such as 
Goldman) show how the doctrine has developed.  Cf. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114 (describing 
Citigroup’s exposure to the subprime crisis). 
 253.  Goldman Sachs, 2011 WL 4826104 at *2. 
 254.  Id.  
 255.  Id. 
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consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention.’256   
 
Plaintiffs only alleged “unethical” conduct, which “is not the type of 
wrongdoing envisioned by Caremark.”257  The plaintiffs described only 
legal business decisions, and “[l]egal, if risky, actions that are within 
management’s discretion to pursue are not ‘red flags’ that would put a 
board on notice of unlawful conduct.”258 
Only one significant case has come out the other way, the 
Countrywide Shareholders litigation.259  Here, plaintiffs alleged that from 
2002-2006, defendants increased production of non-conforming loans, 
which were riskier than conforming loans.260  Furthermore, plaintiffs 
alleged that Countrywide increased the riskiness of the loans by offering 
them to homebuyers without requiring proof of income, which “often 
violated the Company’s own loan underwriting policies,” and the 
complaint provided “the accounts of numerous confidential witnesses, who 
are mostly former employees such as underwriters and loan officers, 
relating how Countrywide departed from its strict underwriting standards 
by generating large numbers of loans without proper regard for their 
quality.”261  Plaintiffs further alleged that the individual defendants, as well 
as Countrywide’s Audit Committee, Credit Committee, Finance 
Committee, and Operations and Public Policy Committee ignored “red 
flags” that Countrywide’s loan portfolio had taken on too much risk.262  In 
addition, plaintiffs alleged that defendants made false and misleading 
statements about the health of the loans that Countrywide was 
originating.263 
 
 256.  Id. at *19 (quoting Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)). 
 257.  Id. at *20. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  See generally In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 
1044, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. at 1051. 
 262.  The “red flags” included: “(1) the shift to riskier loan products; (2) the rising 
delinquencies in pay-option ARMs and HELOCs; (3) sharply rising rates of negative 
amortization and associated ‘phantom earnings’; (4) the ‘dramatic increase in retained 
interests held on Countrywide’s balance sheet’; (5) the fact that the Company’s valuation of 
MSRs, retained interests and loans held for sale ‘fluctuate[d] wildly without any basis’; (6) 
the pitfalls of other mortgage lenders; and (7) industry publications about nontraditional 
loans, including those that were critical of low-documentation pay option ARMs.”  Id. at 
1053. 
 263.  Id. at 1053. 
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Applying Delaware law, the U.S. District Court in California denied a 
motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that it “establishes a strong 
inference of deliberate recklessness for several of the [i]ndividual 
[d]efendants” because it shows that the committees on which the individual 
defendants sat “were directly responsible for monitoring Countrywide’s 
risk exposures and the financial performance of its loan portfolio, both of 
which implicate a fundamental part of the Company’s business—the 
quality of the loans originated and adherence to underwriting standards.”264 
Furthermore, the court accepted testimony which “suggest[ed] a 
widespread Company culture that encouraged employees to push 
mortgages through without regard to underwriting standards.”265  Because 
the defendants sat on committees which were directly responsible for 
monitoring the risk that led to Countrywide’s losses, and they had 
knowledge of the “red flags,” the court concluded that “the Complaint 
pleads evidence of a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight” as required by Caremark.266  The court went on to say, 
“It defies reason, given the entirety of the allegations, that these Committee 
members could be blind to widespread deviations from the underwriting 
policies and standards being committed by employees at all levels.  At the 
same time, it does not appear that the Committees took corrective 
action.”267 
The duty to be informed has been characterized as “possibly the most 
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win 
a judgment,”268 and thus—Countrywide notwithstanding—appears to be a 
frequent loser.269  This is because the inquiry is effectively about the 
board’s scienter—whether it knowingly disregarded its duty of oversight.270  
 
 264.  Id. at 1081. 
 265.  Id. at 1081-82. 
 266.  Id. (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 269.  See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (discussing oversight 
claims related to criminal conduct by corporate employees); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 
A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing oversight claims related to criminal conduct by 
corporate employees); David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. 1449-N, 
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 33, at *19-20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006) (discussing oversight claims 
related to facilitating fraudulent transactions by third parties); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 
492, 506-07 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing oversight claims related to accounting 
irregularities); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (discussing oversight claims related to criminal 
conduct by employees).  But see Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
215, at *76-77 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (discussing oversight claims involving looting of a 
close corporation). 
 270.  See, e.g., Barrows, 924 A.2d at 940 (“in order to state a viable Caremark claim . . . 
a plaintiff must plead the existence of facts suggesting that the board knew that internal 
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Thus, Robert Miller has observed, “[t]he Delaware courts have [] set a high 
standard in oversight liability cases, much higher than in ordinary business 
judgment cases.”271 
Observers are divided about the role the DTBI should have played in 
the wake of the financial crisis.  On one hand, some worry that courts (in 
particular the Delaware Chancery Court) failed to use the crisis as an 
“opportunity to define meaningful responsibilities by the board.”272  On the 
other hand, some would sustain decisions such as that in Goldman Sachs on 
grounds that risk management is an evolving art, and that judicial 
intervention may stifle innovation.273  Cases such as Countrywide should be 
limited to facts peculiar to the nature of that company’s business, critics 
argue.274 
Framed within the contours of conventional corporate doctrine, 
skepticism about the DTBI is understandable.  We want directors of firms 
to take risks because that is how they make money for the corporations they 
manage.  The judiciary cannot both demand that they maximize value for 
shareholders and punish them for attempting to do so.275  Applied to 
 
controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or materially 
harmful behavior, and that the board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that 
it knew existed.”). 
 271.  Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial 
Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 84 (2010). 
 272.  J. Robert Brown, Delaware Courts and Exonerating the Board from Supervising 
Risk: In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation (Introduction), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG 
(March 12, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-
law/delaware-courts-and-exonerating-the-board-from-supervising-r-4.html; see also Eric J. 
Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 739 (2010) (“It seems 
fantastic that the duty to monitor . . . incentivizes boards to take no responsibility for the 
business results of the company—a complete disregard for the principle that the corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction of the board.”). 
 273.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 967, 982 (2009) (“If, in applying Caremark to risk management failures, courts are 
perceived as imposing liability on boards for failing to adopt some specific model of risk 
management, the evolutionary market processes by which optimal best practices emerge 
may be aborted.”). 
 274.  Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 268 (2014) (“The 
lasting impact of Countrywide may be limited to cases involving issuers that have one line 
of business and make statements—even generalized statements, regarding that business 
model that are fundamentally untrue where this disconnect is common knowledge within the 
company.”). 
 275.  As Bratton and Wachter have explained, directors of large firms that did not invest 
in mortgage-related securities were punished in the market, at least in the short run.  
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); see also Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate 
Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2011) (arguing that shareholders will use 
intragroup credit guarantees to increase value for shareholders at the expense of creditors 
who will be unable to recover in the event the corporate group as a whole goes bankrupt). 
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ordinary firms, it is difficult to see the objection to the DTBI as it has 
developed to this point.  Institutional analysis would suggest that market 
forces—duly elected directors—are usually in a far better position to assess 
risk than courts, and so the judiciary should play little role. 
However, comparative institutional analysis also indicates that a 
different approach to the DTBI is in order with respect to very large 
financial firms.  Specifically, courts in this context should relax the focus 
on board scienter, to consider whether risks taken were appropriate given 
the institutional setting in which these firms operate.276  Were the risks 
willfully ignored (an easier case), or known but at a very high level of 
generality, given their systemic implications (a harder case)?  Complexity 
both creates the conditions that lead to regulatory displacement and, 
perhaps ironically, makes it harder to pin down a director’s state of mind: 
complexity permits plausible deniability, and thus an incentive to ignore or 
downplay risk at the margins. 
Of course, judges will not have greater expertise than directors (or 
presumably regulators) in this context.  Nevertheless, a more searching use 
of the DTBI here would be valuable because the institutional alternatives 
are worse.  Unmotivated by fiduciary review, directors have only modest 
incentives to police concentration and complexity at large financial firms.  
Regulators should, of course, proxy for courts in this context.  But their 
deep capture by large financial firms makes it unlikely that regulators can 
help, either.  When market and regulatory responses fail in a significant 
way, correction falls to the judiciary. 
Put another way: if directors of large financial firms are not in a 
position to monitor their firms’ risks and manage them appropriately, who 
is? While executives will likely be better informed than directors, there is 
little reason to believe that they have the long-term incentives to manage 
risk appropriately.  The crisis demonstrates that they were rewarded by 
ignoring long-term risks.277  Rather, if they believe that regulators will save 
 
 276.  I recognize that some may worry that this would amount to “piling on” given that 
Dodd-Frank creates a power to recapture board compensation after a SIFI has failed.  
Section 210(s) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides: 
The Corporation, as receiver of a covered financial company, may recover from 
any current or former senior executive or director substantially responsible for 
the failed condition of the covered financial company any compensation 
received during the 2-year period preceding the date on which the Corporation 
was appointed as the receiver of the covered financial company, except that, in 
the case of fraud, no time limit shall apply.  
12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(s).  This will be meaningful only after a resolution and only if the FDIC 
chooses to proceed.  Given regulatory displacement, the latter seems improbable.  A suit 
alleging breach of a duty to be informed would be a private action. 
 277.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of 
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them—as happened in the crisis and as seems likely under regulatory 
displacement—they would find it difficult to manage less aggressively.  
Counterparties, meaning other large financial firms (or the government 
itself), will not impose “market discipline” because they, too, braid with 
regulators, and tacitly (perhaps unconsciously) expect that they will likely 
be immune from the consequences of many highly risky and problematic 
decisions. 
Directors, however, are in a somewhat different position.  Their duties 
are chiefly to the firm, not to its executives.  We expect them to maintain 
some independence from executives.  While some boards are no doubt 
captured by the executives of the firms for which they serve, there is 
simply no one else in a better position to assess the firm’s long-term risks 
and rewards than the board.  The buck must stop somewhere, and that 
should be with those who manage and control the firm—its directors.  If 
financial services firms are so large or complex (or both) that directors 
cannot meaningfully assess their risk profiles, then they are in the best 
position to change this.  They can require executives to divest or simplify 
firm assets and structures, or they can employ better technologies to 
manage risk, or some combination thereof.278  Indeed, perhaps the stress 
tests and living wills proscribed by Dodd-Frank would aid this effort.279  If 
they do not, courts should take more seriously directors’ duties to oversee 
very large financial firms.280 
I have no illusions that this would be easy for courts.  The very size 
and complexity that make it difficult for regulators to prevent and manage 
crises will make it hard for courts to assess whether boards of troubled 
financial firms did such a poor job of oversight as to warrant liability.  
 
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 257 (2010) (pointing out that top-five executives at the failing firms cashed out large 
amounts of performance based compensation during risky periods). 
 278.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L. SETTLEMENTS, 
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE RISK DATA AGGREGATION AND RISK REPORTING 6 (2013),  
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs239.pdf. 
 279.  Although note, as indicated above, that a living will apparently cannot form the 
basis for a “private right of action.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(7) (stating that “No private 
right of action may be based on any resolution plan submitted in accordance with this 
subsection.”).   
 280.  An obvious objection here is that it appears to be an ex post remedy, meaning that a 
court would scrutinize directors’ oversight only after the collapse of a large financial firm—
something I would hope to avoid.  This need not be true, however, as the Delaware judges 
and the opinions they write, as well as their other pronouncements (e.g., in law review 
articles) have important expressive functions independent of resolving specific cases.  
Indeed, Caremark, which set off discussion about the DTBI, can be seen as such an 
“expressive” use of the judicial dais.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of 
Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 12 STAN. J. L. FIN. & B. 224 (2007). 
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Compounding the problem will be the regulatory complexity created by the 
interactions of regulators and the regulated, discussed in Part I.  How 
culpable should directors be for risks imposed upon them by a regulatory 
system that they influenced in part, but not in whole?  As proposals such as 
single-point of entry take shape—which will require holding companies to 
increase their debt-load—questions about risk assessment and liability for 
errors in those assessments will present significant challenges for all 
involved. 
Thus, the most that can be said for recognizing a heightened duty to be 
informed on the part of directors of systemically important financial 
institutions is that it appears to be the least bad of a host of poor choices.  
Perhaps a collateral virtue is that it would restore some institutional 
balance.  As others have observed, courts were disturbingly quiescent in the 
financial crisis, ignoring serious legal problems with the Bear Stearns 
bailout and the Chrysler bankruptcy, among others.281  Courts can decline 
the opportunity to independently influence the conditions that give rise to 
financial crises.  But in doing so, they risk their own institutional 
legitimacy.  Rethinking a director’s duty to be informed in the context of 
systemically important financial institutions may be a way to help restore 
(maintain) that legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The watchwords of institutional analysis are “participation” and 
“tradeoffs.”  This Article has shown that regulatory displacement is, like all 
problems of institutional choice, ultimately one of participation.  
Regulators and large financial firms increasingly appear to braid in ways 
that give the regulators and the regulated participatory incentives to 
displace markets and courts as institutional choices to prevent or resolve 
financial distress.  Yet, this interaction appears incapable of addressing the 
pathologies that lead to crises: concentration and complexity.  While this 
may benefit the firms themselves in the short run, the cautionary tale from 
the crisis of 2008—the doom loop in which we appear to be stuck—is that 
there are long-term financial and social costs associated with this 
institutional choice. 
No institutional choice is perfect; choices can only be made 
intelligently by assessing the costs and benefits—tradeoffs—associated 
 
 281.  See Lipson & Vandermeuse supra note 241, at 1161 (discussing Supreme Court’s 
handling of Chrysler bankruptcy); David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 1405, 1406 (2014) (arguing that “the courts have had almost nothing to say about 
either the crisis or what the other two branches of government did during it.”). 
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with each choice.  This Article has shown both how to do this in thinking 
about financial crises, and why doing so may lead to better outcomes.  It 
reveals the causes and cures of regulatory displacement, and a credible 
(albeit imperfect) path to restoring judicial balance in the institutional mix.  
While every institutional choice is flawed, ignoring institutional analysis 
does assure one kind of perfection: It guarantees failure. 
